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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
TEX WILLIAM ATKINS, & 
STEVEN PAUL THUNEHORST, 
Case No. 20040371-CA 
Defendants/Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of aiding 
or assisting in wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third 
degree felony (R. 2-3).1 This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where the state established that the crime was committed 
in Uintah County, did the trial court commit reversible error in 
allocating to defendant the burden of proving that he was Indian, 
in order to except himself from state jurisdiction? 
1
 This appeal represents the consolidation of three cases, 
each involving a single defendant. See Order of Consolidation at 
addendum A. All transcript and record citations will be to the 
Reber case materials. For purposes of linguistic flow, the state 
employs the singular, "defendant," rather than the plural. 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant, 
who initially claimed to be a Timpanogos Tribe Indian but later 
asserted that he was a Uintah Band member of the Indians of Utah 
Territory, was not legally Indian and was, therefore, subject to 
state jurisdiction? 
Trial court jurisdictional rulings are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, 55, 
11 P.3d 709 (citing State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)). 
3. Did the trial court properly reject mistake of law as a 
defense to aiding in the destruction of protected wildlife where 
the oral testimony defendant sought to introduce did not fit 
within the parameters of the mistake statute and the written 
opinions were not relevant to the crime charged? 
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court ruling 
below. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992), overruled 
on other grounds, State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (Utah 
2003); State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, 56, 57 P.3d 1134. 
4. Where defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge 
was not timely filed, where he offered no good cause for delay, 
and where, in any event, he inadequately briefed the issue on 
appeal, can he prevail on his claim that he was prejudiced by the 
trial court's alleged bias? 
-2-
This Court declines to consider issues that are not properly 
presented for appeal. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 
135, 58, 47 P.3d 107 (court declines to consider argument that is 
inadequately briefed); State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 531, 973 P.2d 
404 (court declines to consider issue where party fails to engage 
in meaningful analysis of legal authority). 
"Determining whether a trial judge committed error by 
failing to recuse himself . . . under the Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct, rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and our 
accompanying case law is a question of law, and we review such 
questions for correctness." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 
(Utah 1998) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (West 2004), governing penalties 
for wanton destruction of protected wildlife, provides that: 
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction 
of protected wildlife if that person: 
(a) commits an act in violation of . . . 
Section 23-20-3(1). . . and 
(c)(i) does so with intentional, knowing, or 
reckless conduct . . . 
(3) Wanton destruction of wildlife is punishable: 
(a) as a third degree felony if: 
(ii) a trophy animal was captured, 
injured, or destroyed. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 (West 2004), governing taking or 
transporting protected wildlife, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as provided in this title or a 
rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife 
Board, a person may not: 
(a) take. . . 
(i) protected wildlife or their parts. . . 
(b) transport . . . protected wildlife or 
their parts. . . or 
(d) possess protected wildlife . . . 
unaccompanied by a valid license, permit, 
[or] tag . . . 
(2) Possession of protected wildlife without 
a valid license, permit, [or] tag . . . is 
prima facie evidence that the protected 
wildlife was illegally taken and is illegally 
held in possession. 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-23 (West 2004), governing aiding or 
assisting, provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to aid or 
assist any other person to violate any 
provisions of this code or any rules or 
regulations promulgated under it. The 
penalty for violating this section is the 
same as for the provision or regulation for 
which aid or assistance is given. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304 (West 2004), governing mistake o 
fact or law, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or 
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable 
mental state is a defense to any prosecution 
for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the 
existence or meaning of a penal law is no 
defense to a crime unless: 
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(a) Due to his ignorance or 
mistake, the actor reasonably 
believed his conduct did not 
constitute an offense; and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake 
resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of 
the law contained in a written 
order or grant of permission by an 
administrative agency charged by 
law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question; 
or 
(ii) A written interpretation 
of the law contained in an opinion 
of a court of record or made by a 
public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aiding or assisting 
in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree 
felony (R. 2-3). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction (R. 12-13). After extensive briefing and hearings 
on jurisdiction and subsidiary issues related to jurisdiction, 
the court denied the motion (R. 359-64 at addendum B). Defendant 
was then tried by a jury, which convicted him as charged (R. 505-
06, 564). The court ordered a suspended prison term of zero-to-
five years, restitution of $4000, a fine of either $1250 or 250 
hours of community service, and three years of probation with 
conditions attached (R. 562-65 at addendum C). Defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal (R. 566-67). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the 2002 deer hunt, a truck pulled up to a checkpoint 
in Uintah County where the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
was checking for chronic wasting disease (R. 584: 157). There 
was a large mule deer buck in the truck bed, but no permit, 
license, or tag attached to the animal (Id. at 158). Defendant 
and his son, as well as two other relatives, were in the truck 
(Id. at 162). 
Defendant told a conservation officer that his son had shot 
the deer but that he felt responsible for the act (Id. at 164, 
167). The son corroborated that he had killed the deer (Id. at 
165). The conservation officer testified that defendant had 
blood on his hands, and defendant's brother testified that 
defendant had helped load the deer into the truck (Id. at 165, 
180) . 
Based on this evidence, defendant was charged with aiding or 
assisting in the wanton destruction of wildlife (R. 2-3). The 
crime was charged as a third degree felony because the animal was 
a trophy deer, statutorily defined as "any buck with an outside 
antler measurement of 24 inches or greater." Utah Code Ann. § 23-
13-2(46) (a) (West 2004). The parties stipulated to the size of 
the antler spread (R. 584: 165-66). Defendant filed numerous 
pre-trial motions. After the motions had been briefed, heard, 
and denied, defendant stood trial, and a jury convicted him as 
charged (R. 584: 211). Defendant filed a timely appeal, seeking 
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review of the trial court's pretrial rulings (R. 566-67). This 
Court consolidated defendant's appeal with two other appeals 
raising identical issues (Order of Consolidation at addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has organized his lengthy appellate brief into 
three issues and six sub-issues, with 22 additional sub-parts 
included within the sub-issues, and two sub-sub-parts. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 1-5. In the interests of efficiency and clarity, the 
state has reframed defendant's claims. 
First, the trial court did not err in ruling that defendant 
must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in order to 
defeat state court jurisdiction. Once the state established that 
the crime occurred in Uintah County, it had carried its burden of 
establishing jurisdiction. The burden then shifted to defendant 
to demonstrate an exception by showing a particular reason why 
the federal courts should assume jurisdiction instead. 
Second, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant was 
not Indian for the purpose of establishing an exception to state 
criminal jurisdiction. Where defendant conceded that the crime 
occurred in Uintah County and where defendant did not adduce 
evidence that would invoke the federal government's interest in 
the special relationship it maintains with certain Indian people, 
the state properly retained jurisdiction. Nothing about 
defendant's assertion that he is a Uintah Band member of the 
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Indians of Utah Territory or about the effect of the Utah 
Partition Act changes this result. 
Third, the trial court correctly refused to allow several 
witnesses to testify about defendant's alleged mistake of law in 
relying on two Tenth Circuit opinions for the belief that he was 
excepted from the law forbidding hunting without a state permit. 
This issue is not only inadequately briefed but also is based on 
a constitutional ground that was not ruled upon in the trial 
court. For these reasons, the Court may decline to even consider 
it. Even so, the argument fails because defendant seeks to 
introduce oral testimonial evidence that is precluded by the 
plain language of the statute governing mistake. And, apart from 
the testimonial evidence, the two cases on which defendant 
purportedly relied were not relevant. Consequently, any reliance 
on them would have been unreasonable. 
Finally, defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the 
trial court's bias. Presumably, this argument addresses the 
denial of his motion to disqualify Judge Payne. Because the 
issue is inadequately briefed, this Court should decline to 
consider it. In any event, because the motion was untimely and 
unsupported with any good cause for the eleven-month delay in 
filing it, the trial court properly denied it. 
ARGUMENT 
The central issue defendant raises in his appellate brief is 
jurisdictional in nature. The law is well-settled that subject 
-8-
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either party or 
the Court. State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992). 
Plainly, "when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, 
neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill that 
void." Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citation omitted). This appeal focuses almost entirely on 
jurisdictional issues raised in pre-trial motions, hearings, and 
orders, all of which concluded that the district court had 
jurisdiction. Notably, the substantive issue at trial, whether 
defendant aided or assisted in the wanton destruction of 
wildlife, is not at issue on appeal. 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT DEFENDANT MUST CARRY THE 
BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING HIS INDIAN 
STATUS; IN ANY EVENT, BECAUSE THE 
PARTIES STIPULATED TO THE FACTS 
ESTABLISHING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
INDIAN FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION, ANY ERROR IN THE 
COURT'S ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that 
he must carry the burden of proving his Indian status in order to 
defeat state court jurisdiction. See Br. of Aplt. at 60; R. 265-
260 at addendum D. Defendant's argument lacks merit. 
The trial court reached a correct legal conclusion. While 
the state bore the initial burden of proving that the crime was 
committed in Utah, once it established that fact, the burden then 
-9-
shifted to defendant to establish that he fit within an exception 
that would preclude the state from exercising jurisdiction. 
The issue of who bears the burden of proving that a 
defendant or a victim is either Indian or non-Indian has been a 
source of some debate among the federal circuits. Although 
courts disagree about who bears the burden of proving a defendant 
is not Indian, they nonetheless seem to agree that, in order to 
invoke federal jurisdiction for a crime committed in Indian 
Country, the federal government must at least establish that 
either the defendant or the victim is Indian.2 Compare United 
States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 978 (10th Cir. 2001) (federal 
government must prove the Indian/non-Indian status of both the 
defendant and the victim because this status will "determin[e] 
whether a federal court has jurisdiction" and under what statute 
jurisdiction is derived); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 
457 (7th Cir. 1984)(government must prove not only that 
defendants are Indian but also that victim was non-Indian) with 
United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 
2005)(federal government must prove the Indian status of either 
defendant or victim, but need not prove non-Indian status of 
either); United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 
1983)(government need not allege non-Indian status of defendant 
2
 For a definition of "Indian Country," see 18. U.S.C. 
§1151 at addendum E. 
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in an indictment under section 1152 and does not have burden of 
going forward on that issue). 
Under Utah law, it is clear that the state bears the burden 
of establishing the trial court's jurisdiction over a defendant. 
See generally State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah App. 
1988)(in proving offense of consumption, state bore burden of 
establishing jurisdictional factor that at least some alcohol was 
consumed in Utah; failure to do so required reversal); see also 
Newavs, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422-24 (Utah 1997) 
(when faced with defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, state bore burden of establishing jurisdiction 
under specific guidelines). 
To establish a state trial court's authority to hear a case, 
the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that some element of the charged offense was committed in Utah. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (West 2004) (listing the various 
methods by which a crime may be committed "wholly or partly 
within the state," thereby subjecting the actor to state court 
jurisdiction); see also State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah 
1995) (applying preponderance standard to jurisdictional 
questions, which must be decided by trial court rather than 
jury). If the state, then, shows by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the offense was committed in Utah, it has met its 
burden with regard to jurisdiction. In this case, the trial 
court found that the crime was committed in Uintah County, and 
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defense counsel conceded that "we don't have evidence that it 
didn't happen within Uintah County" (R. 584: 193). 
Once the state establishes its jurisdiction, the burden 
shifts to defendant to prove circumstances that would deny the 
court of jurisdiction. This view is buttressed by case law. In 
State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that "[defendant] carried his burden of factually 
establishing that he has been ^recognized racially' as a Ute 
Indian." Id. at 933 (emphasis added). In discussing the burden 
of proof in the instant case, the trial court correctly 
recognized the import of Perank by stating: "Given the fact that 
the Perank decision is the most recent appellate decision and 
that it is the opinion of our Supreme Court, this Court is bound 
to follow that decision."3 (R. 263 at addendum D) . 
The legislative history of Utah's jurisdiction statute 
further bolsters the correctness of Perank's statement that the 
defendant must prove that he qualifies for an exception to 
jurisdiction. Recognizing that the case law on this issue has 
been less than clear, the legislature recently amended the 
3
 This Court has ruled inconsistently on the issue. In 
State v. Haqen, this Court cited Sorenson and held that "the 
prosecution was required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that 
defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of 
evidence." 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reversed on 
other ground). In contrast, three years earlier, another panel 
held that "[defendant] had the burden to persuade the trial court 
that he was an ^Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1152-1153." State v. Lucero, No. 860213-CA (Utah App. Aug. 
27, 1987) (unpublished memorandum decision at addendum F). The 
correctness of Haqen is undermined by Perank, cited above. 
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jurisdictional statute to "clarif[y] procedures for challenging 
the state's jurisdiction to prosecute an offense." S.B. 119, 
General Session (2004) (enacted). Under the amended statute, 
once the state 
establish[es] jurisdiction over the offense . 
. . by showing . . . that the offense was 
committed either wholly or partly within the 
borders of the state, . . . the burden is 
upon the defendant to prove, [that] defendant 
is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe . . 
. and that the facts establish that the crime 
is one that vests jurisdiction in tribal or 
federal court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5) (West 2004). While the statute was 
amended after the present case arose, the legislature made clear 
that its intent was to "clarify" the law rather than change its 
essential nature. 
Indeed, when the legislature adds a clarifying provision to 
a statute, that provision generally takes retroactive effect. 
See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988)("[w]hen a 
statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the 
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended 
statute") overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994); Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144, 150-51 
(Utah 1979); Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 P.2d 
208, 210-11 (Utah 1974) (a statute or amendment that "deals only 
with clarification or amplification as to how the law should have 
been understood prior to its enactment" applies retroactively). 
Moreover, placing the burden of proof on defendant comports 
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with the rule adopted in other states that have addressed the 
issue. See Arizona v. Verduqo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1995) ("we hold that the burden to show facts that would 
establish the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, because of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction under [§§ 1152 or 1153], is on 
defendant, not the state"); Pendleton v. Nevada, 734 P.2d 693, 
695 (Nev. 1987) ("[o]nce the state produces evidence that the 
crime took place in the county, it is incumbent upon the 
defendant to prove that the incident took place on lands over 
which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction"); New Mexico 
v. Cutnose, 532 P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) ("[tjhe burden 
was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the 
district court"); Oklahoma v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401, 403 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1989) (disagreeing with defendant's argument that "he 
has no affirmative duty to prove his status as an Indian" in 
attempting to defeat state jurisdiction); Vermont v. St. Francis, 
563 A.2d 249, 251 (Vt. 1989) (holding that defendant has "the 
burden of proving they are Indians"); Washington v. Daniels, 16 
P.3d 650, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("person claiming to be 
Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction must show (1) that 
he is an Indian in the racial sense, and (2) that he is enrolled 
or affiliated with a [federally-recognized tribe] and is 
individually subject to United States jurisdiction"). 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred 
in finding that defendant must carry the burden of proving his 
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Indian status, the error was harmless. "^Harmless' errors are 
^errors which . . . are sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" State v. Hamilton/ 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989)). 
Here, the parties stipulated to the facts regarding 
defendant's Indian status claim. (R. 580: 16-21, 23; R. 265 at 
addendum D). Among other things, the parties stipulated that 
defendant was 15/16 non-Indian by blood, that he was not a member 
of any federally-recognized tribe, and that he had not lived in 
Indian Country for the last 29 years. Id. Thus, even if the 
trial court erred in ruling that defendant must carry the burden 
of proof, that alleged error would have made no difference to the 
determination that he did not legally qualify as Indian. See 
Point Two, infra. Consequently, any error in allocating the 
burden of proof was harmless. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT DEFENDANT, WHO INITIALLY 
CLAIMED TO BE A TIMPANOGOS TRIBE 
INDIAN BUT LATER ASSERTED THAT HE 
WAS AN INDIAN OF UTAH TERRITORY, 
WAS NOT LEGALLY INDIAN AND WAS, 
THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO STATE 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant's jurisdictional argument is multi-faceted and 
complex. Reducing the argument to its simplest terms, he asserts 
that because he is Indian and the crime was committed in Indian 
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Country, the state cannot exercise jurisdiction over his case. 
Jurisdiction over hunting and fishing in Indian Country, he 
contends, rests exclusively with the federal government. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 23-25.4 
The crime here was committed in Uintah County on land that 
was within the original boundaries of the Uncompahgre 
Reservation and is "Indian Country." See R. 584: 191 (trial 
court oral ruling on location of crime); 18 U.S.C. § 1151 
(defining Indian Country) at addendum E; Ute Indian Tribe v. 
State of Utah, 114 F.3d 1513, 1518 & 1530 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, 
denied sub nom, Duchesne County v. Ute Indian Tribe, 522 U.S. 
1107 (1998) (holding that the decision in Hacren v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
399 (1994) did not require the court to recall its prior 
determination in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 
1087, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), that all lands within 
the Uncompahgre Reservation "retained their reservation status 
and remained Indian Country, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribe and the federal government."). Because the land on which 
the crime occurred was Indian Country, the pivotal inquiry for 
purposes of determining jurisdiction is whether defendant meets 
4
 This claim is incorrect ab initio. An Indian who is 
charged with a criminal hunting violation may be subject to 
tribal and/or federal jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4); 
United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 534 
U.S. 1115 (2001) (Indian tribes have inherent criminal 
jurisdiction over non-member Indians); 18 U.S.C. § 1165. 
Defendant's erroneous assertion, however, is peripheral because 
defendant is not an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 
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the legal definition of Indian. If he fails to qualify as 
"Indian," then the state properly exercised jurisdiction. 
The Court may find the following chart useful in 
understanding how jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian 
Country is allocated: 
Crimes by Parties Jurisdiction 
1. By Indians against Indians: 
a. "Major" crimes Federal or Tribal 
(concurrent) 
b. Other crimes Tribal (exclusive) 
2. By Indians against non-Indians: 
a. "Major" crimes Federal or Tribal 
(concurrent) 
b. Other crimes Federal or Tribal 
(concurrent) 
3. By Indians without Victims: Tribal (exclusive) 
4. By non-Indians against Indians: Federal (exclusive) 
5. By non-Indians against non-Indians: State (exclusive) 
6. By non-Indians without Victims: State (exclusive) 
Canby, William, American Indian Law, 168 (3d ed. 1998). 
Underlying all determinations of jurisdiction for crimes 
committed in Indian Country is the nature of the relationship 
between the federal government and federally-recognized Indian 
tribes. That is, federal "regulation is rooted in the unique 
status of Indians as a^ separate people' with their own political 
institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is 
governance of once-sovereign political communities." United 
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). Thus, "w,in 
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dealing with Indians the Federal Government is dealing primarily 
not with a particular race as such but with members of certain 
social-political groups towards which the Federal Government has 
assumed special responsibilities."'" LaPier v. McCormick, 986 
F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Heath, 509 
F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted)). 
The federal government assumes these "special 
responsibilities" only under specific circumstances. For 
example, where either the perpetrator or victim of a crime 
committed in Indian Country meets the legal definition of Indian, 
the federal interest in the crime and its consequences would 
mandate federal jurisdiction and preclude state jurisdiction.5 
See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D. 
1988) (citing D. Getches & C. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law 412-
15 (2d ed. 1986)). The state, in turn, exercises criminal 
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian Country only when 
Indian interests, which would implicate a federal responsibility, 
are absent. See State v. Sorkhabi, 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002) (state's jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian 
Country by non-Indians in victimless crimes or against non-
Indians "is based on the fact that ^such crimes do not involve 
5
 Defendant also tries to bootstrap into federal 
jurisdiction by asserting that the "victim" of his crime was the 
Ute Tribe. See Br. of Aplt. at 27-29. Defendant, however, has 
no standing to assert rights on the Tribe's behalf. Murdock, 132 
F.3d at 542. 
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essential tribal relations or affect the rights of 
Indians'") (citation omitted). 
A. Defendant is not Indian for purposes of determining if the 
state properly exercised jurisdiction in this case. 
The dispositive jurisdictional inquiry for a crime committed 
in Indian Country begins with whether defendant meets the legal 
definition of "Indian."6 If he does, then federal interests are 
implicated and the state is precluded from exercising 
jurisdiction. 
For purposes of criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed 
in Indian Country, the genesis of a test for determining whether 
either a perpetrator or a victim is Indian was first articulated 
in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1846). Through 
subsequent state and federal court rulings, this analysis has 
evolved into a two-part test: 
"Two elements must be satisfied before it can 
be found that [a defendant or victim] is 
Indian under federal law. Initially, it must 
appear that he has a significant percentage 
of Indian blood. Secondly, the [defendant] 
must be recognized as an Indian either by the 
federal government or by some tribe or 
society of Indians." Goforth v. State, 644 
P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. 1982). 
State v. Hagen, 802 P.2d 745, 747 n.2, (Utah App. 1990), reversed 
on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992); accord Perank, 858 
6
 The matter is inherently complex because the definition 
of "Indian" may vary, depending on the context for which identity 
as an Indian is relevant. State v. Perank, 858 P.2d at 927, 932 
n.6 (Utah 1992) (citing Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law 19-20 (1982)). 
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P.2d at 932. This test has been used by many courts, both 
federal and state. See, e.g., United States v. Prentiss, 273 
F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 
758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996); Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241 
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th 
Cir. 1995); United State v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 
1984); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 
1988); State v. Sebastian, 701 A.2d 13, 23-27 (Conn. 1997); State 
v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990); State v. Attebery, 519 
P.2d 53, 54 (Ariz. 1974); State v. Bonaparte, 759 P.2d 83, 85 (ID 
Ct. App. 1988). 
In this case, the parties stipulated and the trial court 
found that defendant carried 1/16 Ute Indian blood from his 
mother and no Indian blood from his father (R. 265 at addendum D; 
R. 362 at addendum B). In assessing what quantum of Indian blood 
satisfies the first prong of the Rogers test, most courts require 
at least 1/4 Indian blood. Venzia v. United States, 245 F. 411 
(8th Cir. 1917)(1/4 to 3/8 found sufficient); State v. LaPier, 790 
P.2d at 986-87 (165/512 found sufficient); State v. Haaen, 802 
P.2d at 747 (5/16 found sufficient); Makah Indian Tribe v. 
Clallam County, 440 P.2d 442, 444 (Wash. 1968) (1/4 found 
sufficient); cf. Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1982) (slightly less than 1/4 found insufficient). Courts 
have differed on whether l/8th Indian blood is sufficient to 
satisfy the first Rogers prong. Compare Sully v. United States, 
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195 F.113, 117, 129 (8th Cir. 1912) (1/8 held sufficient) with 
Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77,80 (Wyo. 1982) (1/8 held 
insufficient). The State could find no cases holding that 1/16 
Indian blood constitutes a "significant amount" of Indian blood 
sufficient to fulfill the first prong of the Rogers test. Under 
the first prong of Rogers, then, defendant does not carry a 
sufficient quantum of Indian blood to qualify as an Indian for 
purposes of invoking a federal interest in criminal jurisdiction. 
The analysis need not go further. Defendant is not an 
Indian under the accepted legal standard and the state, 
consequently, has jurisdiction over his crime even though it 
occurred in Indian Country. An examination of the second Rogers 
prong, while not necessary, further demonstrates how far 
defendant is from qualifying as Indian for federal jurisdictional 
purposes. 
The second prong of the Rogers test, focusing not on race 
but on recognition as an Indian by a tribe or the federal 
government, was comprehensively analyzed in St. Cloud v. United 
States, 702 F. Supp. 1456. There, the court examined "whether 
the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a 
formerly sovereign people." St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461. 
Reviewing existing case law, the St. Cloud court gleaned four 
factors to analyze: 
In declining order of importance, these 
factors are: 1) enrollment in a tribe; 2) 
government recognition formally and 
informally through providing the person 
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assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) 
enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 
4) social recognition as an Indian through 
living on a reservation and participating in 
Indian social life. 
Id. at 1461. These factors, the court noted, are intended not to 
establish "a precise formula," but rather to "guide the analysis 
of whether a person is recognized as an Indian." Id. 
As to the first factor, enrollment in a tribe, defendant's 
claims have shifted. He initially asserted that he was "a member 
of the Timpanogos Tribe[,] . . . a sovereign tribe whose 
existence pre-dates that of the United States" (R. 35). Months 
later, in another memorandum, defendant fashioned himself a 
"Shoshone Indian of Utah Territory"(R. 128), omitting any further 
claim of membership in the Timpanogos Tribe. In yet another 
memorandum, defendant calls himself a Uintah Band member of the 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory (R. 166-68) . While defendant 
asserts membership in these various entities, he has not adduced 
proof of being an enrolled member of any tribe, nor has he 
adduced any proof that the groups in which he asserts membership 
are, indeed, tribal entities. Defendant has thus failed to 
establish that he is "enrolled in a tribe" for purposes of 
fulfilling the second prong of the Rogers test. 
Second, no evidence was adduced that the federal government 
ever recognized defendant as Indian by providing him with 
benefits or services reserved only for Indians. 
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Third, the only record evidence that defendant benefitted 
from tribal affiliation of any sort was that his minor son 
possessed a Timpanogos Tribe hunting permit when they were 
apprehended with the trophy buck in their truck (R. 75). While 
at that time defendant and his son may have claimed an 
association with the Timpanogos Tribe, defendant has since 
abandoned any claim of such affiliation (R. 126, 128, 166-68).7 
The final factor is defendant's social recognition as an 
Indian, including such considerations as living on a reservation 
and participating in an Indian social lifestyle. The record is 
undisputed and the trial court found that defendant, age 51, had 
not lived on or near an Indian reservation for nearly 30 years 
(R. 265 at addendum D, R. 363 at addendum B). 
The record before this Court, then, does not support either 
prong of the Rogers test. The trial court thus correctly 
concluded that defendant was not Indian for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction (R. 360-62 at addendum B). Accordingly, the state 
properly exercised jurisdiction over his case. 
7
 And, indeed, such a claim would get him no further than 
his current claim. See Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, case no. 
2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January 25, 2005) (holding that 
Timpanogos Tribe has no legal identity separate and apart from 
Ute Tribe) at addendum G. 
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B. Defendant's claimed affiliation as a Uintah Band member of 
the Indians of Utah Territory does not provide him with an 
independent, aboriginal right to hunt free from state, 
tribal or federal jurisdiction. 
Defendant eschews the Rogers test, claiming instead that, 
based upon his purported membership in the Uintah Band of the 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, he possesses an aboriginal 
right to hunt, unregulated, in Indian Country. The Uintah Band, 
he claims, while eventually incorporating with two other bands to 
become the Ute Indian Tribe, retained all the rights it formerly 
possessed as a separate Shoshone Band (R. 165-66). Defendant 
concludes that his right to hunt thus predates the existence of 
the Ute Tribe and exists wholly apart from the Ute Tribe, coming 
as it does from his Shoshone ancestors who were Uintah Band 
members. See Br. of Aplt. at 35-39. 
Defendant's argument was unequivocally rejected by the 
federal courts in United States v. Murdock, 919 F.Supp. 1534 (D. 
Utah 1996), aff'd, 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 
Murdock v. United States, 525 U.S. 810 (1998). In that case, 
Perry Murdock, the son of two "mixed-bloods" terminated from the 
Ute Indian Tribe under the Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677a 
et seq., claimed the right to hunt and fish on the Reservation 
because he was a member of the Uintah Band. See Murdock, 919 
F.Supp at 1540-42; 132 F.3d at 540-41. In affirming the district 
court's holding that Murdock did not retain aboriginal hunting 
and fishing rights through the Uintah Band, the Tenth Circuit 
held: 
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The [Ute Tribe's] Constitution thus makes 
clear that the Bands ceased to exist 
separately outside the Ute Tribe, that 
jurisdiction over what was formerly the 
territory of the Uintah Band was to be 
exercised by the Ute Tribe, and that the 
rights formerly vested in the Uintah Band 
were to be defined by the Ute Constitution 
and exercised by the Ute Tribe. In light of 
these provisions, [Murdock's] argument that 
the Uintah Band's hunting and fishing rights 
retain a separate existence and belong only 
to the Uintah Band is groundless. Even if 
[Murdock] is correct that the Uintah Band 
continues to maintain its own identity, under 
the Ute Constitution the Band does so only 
within the context of the Ute Tribe. 
Accordingly, [Murdock] has no right of user 
in hunting and fishing rights originally 
granted to the Uintah Tribe. 
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541; cf. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, case 
no. 2:00-CV-734 TC, Order at 11 (January 25, 2005) at addendum G 
(citing favorably the testimony of two experts who concluded 
"that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that 
presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos 
Tribe, . . . and that the Timpanogos, other than as members of 
the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation"). 
Defendant's claim, based on his membership as a Uintah Band 
Shoshone Indian of Utah Territory, is similarly groundless. 
Where the Uintah Band was formally incorporated into the Ute 
Tribe, hunting and fishing rights originally accorded Uintah Band 
members no longer retain a separate existence from the Ute Tribe. 
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541. Defendant's claim of a separate 
hunting right premised upon the Uintah Band's retained aboriginal 
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rights thus fails for the same reasons Murdock's identical claim 
failed before the federal courts. 
C. The Ute Partition Act (UPA) is relevant only insofar as 
defendant claims a right to hunt and fish deriving from his 
mother's status as a mixed-blood Ute whose name appeared on 
the mixed-blood roll. 
Defendant contends that he is a Uintah Band member of the 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, not a Ute Indian, and that 
the Ute Partition Act is irrelevant, an analytical "red herring" 
to the merits of his case (Br. of Aplt. at 42).8 Nonetheless, he 
relies on the UPA to assert that he has an interest in Ute tribal 
8
 Defendant also claims that the UPA is unconstitutional 
because it violates the equal protection clause. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 56-59. Defendant, however, failed to argue this issue 
at trial, and the court, accordingly, did not rule on it. 
Defendant has, therefore, waived consideration of the 
constitutional issue on appeal. See, e.g.. State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990) (appellate courts "generally will not 
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellant 
raises on appeal for the first time"). Moreover, defendant has 
failed to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances, 
the two recognized exceptions to the waiver doctrine. See State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 & n.3 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989); Jolivet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989). In any event, the constitutional 
issues related to the UPA have been raised and rejected in the 
federal courts. See, e.g., Murdock, 132 F.3d at 541-42. 
Moreover, defendant argues that his due process rights were 
violated. See Br. of Aplt. at 59-73 (asserting due process 
violations in trial court's allocation of burden of proof, in 
trial court's determination that mistake of law did not apply, 
and in trial court's alleged bias). While due process was 
tangentially referenced in defendant's briefing to the trial 
court, the court did not frame its rulings in constitutional 
terms, and defendant never invoked rulings on the constitutional 
issues. See R. 260-65 at addendum D (burden of proof); R. 319-23 
at addendum H (mistake of law); R. 295 at addendum I (judicial 
bias). Accordingly, these issues are waived as well. State v. 
Richins, 2004 UT 36, 5 8, 86 P.3d 759. 
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hunting and fishing rights (Id. at 42-47) . In essence, defendant 
seeks simultaneously to disassociate himself from the Ute Tribe 
and, at the same time, to interpret provisions of the Ute 
Partition Act, which applied to those persons who were members of 
the Tribe when the UPA was passed in 1954, to his own benefit. 
He cannot have it both ways. At its crux, defendant's argument 
fails because the right to hunt is a personal right and is 
limited to mixed-blood Utes whose names appeared on the 
termination roll. Defendant has no claim to those rights under 
any circumstances. 
Some context for defendant's claim is necessary. When 
Congress enacted the Ute Partition Act in 1954, it divided the 
Ute Tribe into two groups: "full-blood members" and "mixed-blood 
members."9 Subsequently, a list of the mixed-blood members of the 
Ute Tribe was published in the Federal Register. United States 
v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1507 (10th Cir. 1985). This list came 
to be known as the mixed-blood roll.10 The Ute Partition Act 
stated that, when the roll was published, "^the tribe shall 
thereafter consist exclusively of full-blood members. Mixed-
9
 "Full-blood members" had one-half degree of Ute blood and 
a total Indian blood of more than one-half. United States v. 
Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1507 (10th Cir. 1985). "Mixed-blood 
members" had insufficient Ute or Indian blood to qualify as full-
blood members or they met the full-blood standards but elected to 
be treated as mixed-blood members. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. 
§677a(b), (c). 
10
 The list is also sometimes referred to as the 
"termination roll." 
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blood members shall have no interest therein except as otherwise 
provided in this subchapter.' 25 U.S.C. §677d." Id. Considering 
the language of the UPA, this Court has noted: "By terminating 
federal control over ^mixed-blood' Utes, Congress expressly 
transferred jurisdiction over them to state courts." State v. 
Gardner, 827 P.2d 980, 981 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant's mother 
was a "mixed-blood" and was terminated in accordance with the 
terms of the UPA (R. 265 at addendum D). 
The net effect of the UPA, finalized in 1961, was to end 
exclusive federal supervision of mixed-blood members and to give 
these terminated Ute tribal members complete control over their 
proportionate share of interest in all tribal assets that could 
practically and equitably be distributed. Felter, 752 F.2d at 
1507 (citing 25 U.S.C. §677o (a)). Those assets not susceptible 
to such distribution were to be jointly managed by the Ute Tribe 
and authorized representatives of the terminated or mixed-blood 
Utes. United States v. Felter, 546 F.Supp. 1002, 1005 (D. Utah 
1982). aff'd 752 F.2d 1505.n 
The UPA did not specifically address hunting and fishing 
rights. In 1982, however, the federal district court held that 
11
 The mixed-bloods' authorized representative, the Ute 
Distribution Corporation (UDC), manages these assets. See 25 
U.S.C. § 677i; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128 (1972). Originally, the stockholders in the UDC were the 490 
mixed-bloods. Today, less than 160 original mixed-bloods 
continue to own shares in the UDC. See Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 
F.3d 1457, 1463 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994). UDC stock is "freely 
transferable." IcL. at 1462. 
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Oranna Felter, a former member of the Ute Tribe who was listed on 
the mixed-blood roll, retained her personal right as a former 
tribal member to hunt and fish on the Reservation. United States 
v. Felter, 546 F.Supp. 1002. The court refused to construe 
silence in the UPA as an abrogation of the mixed-blood rights to 
hunt and fish on the reservation. Id. at 1017-18 (citing 
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968). 
The court recognized that NX[t]he right of user in tribal hunting 
and fishing rights that Oranna B. Felter and the other mixed-
bloods possessed as tribal members was a personal right. It was 
neither alienable, assignable, transferable nor descendible." 
Id. at 1023 (emphasis added).12 Moreover, the right of user, 
whether exercised by a tribal member or a mixed-blood, was 
subject to regulation by the Ute Tribe, id. at 1024 & n.47, 1025, 
and 
12
 The Tenth Circuit in Felter identified the right to hunt 
and fish as "an asset not susceptible to equitable and 
practicable distribution" within the meaning of the UPA. 752 
F.2d at 1514; see 25 U.S.C. § 677o(a). However, it was an 
indivisible right of a different sort than the rights managed by 
the UDC. The right to hunt and fish was a personal right of 
user, derived directly from the mixed-bloods' former membership 
in the Ute Tribe, but not represented by stock ownership in the 
UDC. Each of the original 4 90 mixed-bloods whose names appeared 
on the mixed-blood roll personally retained the right but, unlike 
the indivisible assets managed by the UDC, this right was not in 
any way transferable. Moreover, when each holder of the right 
died, "so did his or her personal right of user." Felter, 546 F. 
Supp. at 1025 (footnote and citation omitted). Through 
attrition, then, the mixed-blood right to hunt and fish is slowly 
extinguished, thus completing the process of termination. 
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[i]ndividual mixed-blood Utes enrolled upon 
the final mixed—blood Roll (and still living) 
are thus entitled to hunting and fishing 
privileges within the Ute reservation 
equivalent to those afforded members of the 
tribe as now defined. As each of the mixed-
blood Utes passes away, his or her personal 
right of user is extinguished, it being 
neither inheritable or transferable. 
Recalling that the thrust of termination was 
to end federal supervision of Indian assets, 
not to extinguish the Indians' rights without 
just compensation, the continuing right of 
user concept accomplishes that end without 
incurring inequities, administrative 
complications, or liability under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Felter, 546 F.Supp. at 1025 (footnote omitted). See also 
Murdock, 132 F.3d at 538-39. A mixed-blood Ute whose name 
appeared on the mixed-blood roll, then, could continue to hunt 
and fish during his/her lifetime. 
In this case, the evidence is undisputed that defendant's 
mother was a mixed-blood Ute and that her name appeared on the 
mixed-blood roll (R. 265 at addendum D). Consequently, despite 
termination, she nonetheless retained the personal right of user 
to hunt and fish on the reservation during her lifetime. See 
e.g,, Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509. That right, however, was not 
transferable or inheritable by her son, the defendant in this 
case: 
The children of persons listed on the mixed-
blood roll would not enjoy the entitlement 
had by their parents. If they are to 
exercise any such tribal right that may occur 
-30-
only through direct affiliation with the 
tribe as members. 
Felter, 546 F. Supp. at 1025, n.52 (citing F. Cohen, Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law 185 (1942 ed.); accord Murdock, 132 F.2d at 
540. The trial court in this case reflected the essence of the 
Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Felter when it observed: "The Court 
does not believe that Congress intended to terminate an ancestors 
[sic] status as Indian only to continue that relationship with 
their descendants'' (R. 361 at addendum B) . With respect to 
tribal hunting rights, the court properly ruled that hunting 
rights enjoyed by defendant's mother, a mixed-blood Ute, did not 
pass to her son, who never enjoyed Ute tribal membership.13 
See Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509. 
While defendant claims no association with the Ute Tribe, it 
is only through Ute tribal membership that the UPA would be 
applicable to him. Even then, however, he would not retain any 
hunting or fishing rights because he is the son of a terminated 
13
 In a further contortion of the UPA, its purposes, and 
its application by the courts, defendant maintains that because 
he was born at the time of termination but was not listed on the 
mixed-blood roll, nothing in the UPA applied to him. See Br. of 
App. at 51-54). The absence of defendant's name from the 
termination roll is, as the court noted, wholly irrelevant, 
reflecting as it does the undisputed facts that "at the time of 
the termination act, [defendant was] not [an] enrolled member of 
the Ute Tribe, and therefore could not be an individual who could 
receive tribal benefits. Because [he was] not [a] tribal 
member[. . . he] could not have been listed on the termination 
proclamation" (R. 361 at addendum B). Plainly, defendant could 
not be terminated from a status he never sought or enjoyed. 
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Ute and the personal right of user to hunt and fish, while 
enjoyed by his mother, could not be passed down to him. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED 
MISTAKE OF LAW AS A DEFENSE TO 
AIDING IN THE DESTRUCTION OF 
PROTECTED WILDLIFE WHERE THE ORAL 
TESTIMONY DEFENDANT SOUGHT TO 
INTRODUCE DID NOT FIT WITHIN THE 
PARAMETERS OF THE STATUTE GOVERNING 
MISTAKE AND THE WRITTEN OPINIONS 
WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE CRIME 
CHARGED 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it rejected 
his mistake-of-law defense and, consequently, refused to allow 
several witnesses to testify in support of what he claimed was 
his reasonable but mistaken belief that he could hunt without a 
state permit.14 See Br. of Aplt. at 65-72. 
14
 In ruling on defendant's request, the trial court cited 
three rationales offered by defendant during pre-trial 
proceedings to justify his assertion that he could hunt without a 
state permit: 
1) Because he is a descendant of a terminated 
Ute and has inherited hunting privileges from 
his mother; or 
2) Because he was alive at the time that the 
Termination Proclamation was issued and was 
not listed on the proclamation; and therefore 
has maintained rights to hunt; or 
3) Because he is an aboriginal Indian of Utah 
Territory who retains aboriginal hunting 
rights. 
R. 322 at addendum H. These rationales had all been rejected by 
the court in previous rulings. Id. 
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This argument fails at the outset for wholly inadequate 
briefing. Nowhere in his appellate brief does defendant 
articulate the precise nature of the mistake he claims he made or 
exactly how the mistake-of-law doctrine specifically applies to 
the facts. The law is well-settled that "to permit meaningful 
appellate review, briefs must comply with the briefing 
requirements sufficiently to ^enable us to understand . . . what 
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those 
errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, those 
errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other 
relief.'" Burns v. Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 
1996)(quoting Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 
App. 1988)). Defendant's argument fails because he has not 
explained the asserted error in sufficient detail to enable this 
Court to clearly understand its essential nature. 
A further difficulty with defendant's appellate brief is 
that he has framed his appellate argument as a due process claim. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 59-60, 65-67. The trial court's ruling, 
however, is not based on constitutional grounds. Rather, the 
ruling interprets the statute governing mistake, reviews 
pertinent case law, and applies rules 401 and 402 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. See R. 319-23 at addendum H. The trial court 
did not rule on constitutional grounds, and there is no 
constitutional ruling from which to appeal. State v. Richins, 
2004 UT App 36 at 28. 
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To the extent that the state has successfully gleaned the 
meaning of defendant's mistake-of-law argument, it fails. 
Defendant seems to assert that the trial court's rulings that he 
was not Indian and that jurisdiction properly rested with the 
state "established that the Defendants' reliance on [two] 10th 
Circuit rulings constituted a ^mistake'" of law, triggering the 
applicability of mistake as an affirmative defense to the charge 
of aiding in the destruction of protected wildlife. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 65-66 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304). To support 
his defense, defendant sought to introduce the oral testimony of 
the federal appellate court judges who authored the opinions on 
which defendant allegedly relied; two law professors; the Uintah 
County Attorney; the Chief Executive Officers of the Timpanogos 
Tribe; and members of the Uintah Band, the Uncompahgre Band, and 
an Indian of Utah Territory. See Br. of Aplt. at 68-69; R. 323 
at addendum H. 
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons: first, because 
he sought to establish a mistake-of-law defense by introducing 
oral testimony that did not fit within the parameters of the 
statute governing mistake; and, second, because the two Tenth 
Circuit cases on which he relies are legally irrelevant. 
First, as to the oral testimony he sought to introduce, the 
statute governing mistake of law provides that the mistake must 
result from reasonable reliance on "a written interpretation of 
the law contained in an opinion of a court of record" or on "[a]n 
-34-
official [written] statement of the law . . . by an 
administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
304(2) (b) (i)-(ii). The plain language of the law makes no 
provision for the oral legal interpretations of either the 
written opinion's authoring judges or of law professors or for 
the general oral opinions of tribal representatives who have not 
been charged with any responsibility for interpreting state law 
governing the taking of protected wildlife. See State v. Norton, 
2003 UT App 88, 1 13, 67 P.3d 1050 ("The language of section 76-
2-304 clearly and unambiguously requires a written 
interpretation, by either a court of record or a public servant, 
in order for mistake of law to be an available defense"). 
Because the oral testimony of defendant's proposed witnesses did 
not fall within the plain language of the law governing mistake, 
the court properly excluded it. See R. 319 at addendum H. 
Second, defendant purported to rely on two Tenth Circuit 
cases, Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002), 
and Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997). 
Given the procedural posture and holdings of these cases, 
however, they were legally irrelevant. Consequently, any 
reliance on them would have been patently unreasonable. 
Timpanogos Tribe was an interlocutory appeal from the denial 
of the state's motion to dismiss under rule 12(b) (6), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 286 F.3d at 1198. In that context, a 
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panel of the Tenth Circuit determined that the Timpanogos Tribe 
"may establish federal question jurisdiction in asserting its 
hunting rights" even though it was not a federally recognized 
tribe.15 Id. at 1203-04. This ruling merely permitted the suit 
to continue; the court granted no other relief at that time. Id. 
at 1203-04. Defense counsel, intimately familiar with Conway 
because he served as counsel on the case, fails to explain how or 
why a ruling on a motion to dismiss caused him to reasonably 
believe that he was exempt from state law forbidding hunting 
without a state permit. That issue had plainly not been 
litigated when Conway was issued.16 
Ute Indian Tribe, the other case on which defendant purports 
to rely, addresses the boundaries of the Uintah Valley Indian 
Reservation, attempting to resolve a conflict raised by a United 
States Supreme Court decision that conflicted with an earlier 
Tenth Circuit decision. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 
1513. In this case, the trial court was never asked to rule on 
15
 A "federally recognized tribe" is an Indian tribe 
recognized by the United States Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, as an Indian entity. The most recently 
published list of federally recognized Indian tribes is found at 
68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003). — 
16
 Subsequently, the federal district court granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, noting expert testimony 
that the Timpanogos merged with the Utes and now have no rights 
on the Reservation other than as Ute tribal members, and holding 
that the Timpanogos have no legally cognizable aboriginal right 
to hunt and fish on land reserved for the Ute Indians. 
See addendum G at 1-2, 11. 
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any boundary issue, and there is no boundary issue currently 
before the Court in this appeal.17 
Defendant has inadequately briefed the issue of mistake of 
law for appellate review. Moreover, he seeks to establish his 
defense by relying on oral testimony outside the parameters of 
the mistake statute and on written opinions that do not support 
the propositions he asserts, much less the reasonable reliance he 
claims. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in 
refusing to allow him to adduce evidence of mistake of law. 
POINT FOUR 
DEFENDANT'S UNSUPPORTED CLAIM THAT 
HE WAS PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S BIAS SHOULD BE REJECTED NOT 
ONLY FOR INADEQUATE BRIEFING BUT 
ALSO BECAUSE THE MOTION ON WHICH HE 
BASES HIS APPELLATE CLAIM WAS 
UNTIMELY 
Defendant argues that the trial court was biased against him 
throughout the jurisdictional proceedings, as evidenced by the 
court's consistently adverse rulings. Br. of Aplt. at 72-73. 
Indeed, he asserts, the court evidenced a "clear bias against all 
Indians of Utah Territory." Id. at 73. For this reason, 
defendant moved in district court to disqualify Judge Payne, 
supporting his motion with four affidavits. R. 277, 280-92. His 
17
 The parties agreed that the deer was taken in Uintah 
County, in Indian Country. The location was within the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, in the southern 
portion that was previously the Uncompahgre Reservation. It is 
about 30 miles from the current Uintah Valley Reservation. R. 
83-84. 
-37-
appellate argument, presumably, is his response to the trial 
court's denial of his motion. See R. 295 at addendum I. 
Defendant's argument fails at the outset for inadequate 
briefing. It nowhere cites to the trial court's ruling or 
explains why that ruling is incorrect. See Br. of Aplt. at 72-
73. Defendant baldly asserts prejudice, relying only on the fact 
that the trial court ruled against him. Moreover, he fails to 
support his argument, such as it is, with substantial legal 
authority. Indeed, it is "devoid of any 'meaningful analysis.'" 
State v, Marcruez, 2002 UT App 127, 1 10,54 P. 3d 637 (citation 
omitted). The law is well-established that Utah appellate courts 
decline to consider claims where defendant has failed to offer 
any meaningful legal analysis. See, e.g.. State v. Thomas, 1999 
UT 2, 1 13, 974 P.2d 269; State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 531, 973 
P.2d 404; see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (articulating 
briefing requirements). 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's claim, he 
would fare no better. Here, the trial court certified 
defendant's motion to the presiding judge of the district for 
review, as mandated by rule 29(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. R. 293. Rule 29(c)(3)(A) provides: "If the reviewing 
judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed 
in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall 
assign another judge to the action. . .." Utah R. Crim. P. 
29(c)(3)(A) (West 2004)(emphasis added). According to the plain 
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language of the statute, all three requirements must be met 
before the reviewing judge can reassign the case. The absence of 
any one requirement is fatal to the motion. 
Here, the reviewing court examined the pleadings, determined 
that the motion was not timely, and then returned the case to the 
trial court. In so doing, the court ruled that the affidavits 
accompanying the motion demonstrated that the "bias and 
prejudice, if any, that is alleged was known by the affiants 
prior to the court's ruling on the question of jurisdiction." R. 
295 at addendum I. Noting that defendant filed his motion 
"woefully late," the court denied the motion. Id. 
The result reached by the reviewing court is correct. The 
plain language of rule 29(c) (1) (B) states that a motion to 
disqualify a judge: 
. . . shall be filed after commencement of 
the action, but not later than 20 days after 
the last of the following: 
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to 
the judge; 
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's 
attorney; 
(iii) the date on which the moving party 
learns or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have learned of the grounds 
upon which the motion is based. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29 (c) (1) (B) (West 2004). This rule is rooted in 
judicial efficiency. Ruling in a civil context but with a 
rationale equally applicable to the criminal context, the Utah 
Supreme Court has observed: 
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[D]elay imposes unnecessary disruption on 
both the judicial system and litigants. A 
disqualification proceeding is a collateral 
attack on the substantive action, it disrupts 
orderly litigation, and it necessarily 
results in significant additional cost to the 
parties. Accordingly, a party must move with 
dispatch once a basis for disqualification is 
discovered. 
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc, 767 P.2d 538, 542 
(1988).18 "Timeliness," the court emphasized, "is essential in 
filing a motion to disqualify." Id. Therefore, the court added, 
"[o]nly if good cause for a delay is demonstrated in the motion 
seeking disqualification should a delinquent motion even be 
considered." Id. at 543. The rule that a motion to disqualify 
should be filed at the earliest opportunity is widely recognized, 
and "courts generally apply this rule with strictness against a 
party who, having knowledge of facts constituting a 
disqualification, does not seek to disqualify the judge until an 
unfavorable ruling has been made." Id. (quoting 4 6 Am.Jur.2d 
Judges § 202, at 225-26 (1969)). 
Here, the case was assigned soon after the information was 
filed, and defense counsel entered his appearance less than a 
month later. R. 2-3, 4-5. The motion to disqualify, therefore, 
should have been filed after the information, but no later than 
18
 At the time the Utah Supreme Court decided Madsen, rule 
63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governing 
disqualification of judges, did not contain a time limit. 767 
P.2d at 541. Since that time, both the civil and criminal rules 
governing disqualification have been amended to include specific 
time limits. See Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B)(West 2004); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 29(c)(1)(B)(West 2004). 
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20 days after defendant knew or should have known of the grounds 
that formed the basis of the motion to disqualify. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 29(c) (1 (B) . 
The grounds for the motion to disqualify are contained in 
four affidavits submitted in support of the motion. See R. 280-
92. The fourth affiant, defense counsel himself, documents his 
experience with Judge Payne in another case in which the court 
relied on blood quantum to rule against his client. See R. 281-
84. 
The information contained in defense counsel's affidavit was 
plainly based on counsel's previous professional experience. 
There is no question but that the information was known to him 
prior to the commencement of this action. Despite defense 
counsel's knowledge, however, he did not file the motion until a 
year after this action was commenced, immediately after receiving 
an unfavorable ruling on the burden of proof issue. See R. 277. 
Moreover, defendant offers no good cause to explain his eleven-
month delay in filing the motion. 
Rule 29(c)(3)(C) plainly states: "The reviewing judge may 
deny a motion not filed in a timely manner.'' Utah R. Crim. P. 
29(c)(3)(C). Where defendant knew of the grounds on which his 
motion was based before the litigation even began and offered no 
good cause for delay in filing it, the trial court properly 
denied his motion. Because the motion was untimely, no further 
review of defendant's substantive claim is warranted. See Birch 
-41-
v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App. 1989) (declining to 
reach legal sufficiency of affidavit alleging judicial bias 
because of untimeliness of motion to disqualify). 
Defendant's claim also fails because the affidavits on which 
he relies are legally insufficient to support his allegation of 
bias. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(3)(A)("If the reviewing judge 
finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in 
good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall 
assign another judge to the action. . . " ) . All four of 
defendant's affidavits in support of the motion document 
instances in which Judge Payne relied on blood quantum to 
determine that either the affiant or the affiant's offspring did 
not meet the legal definition of Indian for jurisdictional 
purposes. See R. 285-92. The law is well-settled that judicial 
N
'bias may not be based solely on the fact that the judge has 
issued prior rulings adverse to the party making the allegation." 
In the Interest of M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998). 
Accord In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 
1997)(memorandum decision of Zimmerman, C.J., sitting 
alone)(stating NMno deduction of bias and prejudice may be made 
from adverse rulings by a judge.'" (quoting 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 
219 (1994))); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 767 
P.2d at 546 (stating "^traditional judicial view is that if a 
judge can be disqualified for bias following a . . . ruling 
during the court proceedings, there is no limit to 
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disqualification motions and there would be a return to "judge 
shopping"'" (quotation omitted)). 
Because defendant's motion and the supporting affidavits 
were both untimely and legally insufficient, the reviewing judge 
properly refused to reassign the case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for one count of aiding or assisting in wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^S^day of April, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG202004 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rickie L. Reber, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Steven Paul Thunehorst, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tex William Atkins, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER OF 
CONSOLIDATION 
Case No. 20040371-CA 
Case No. 20040464-CA 
Case No. 20040644-CA 
Case No. 20040465-CA 
Case No. 20040645-CA 
This matter is before the court on Appellants1 motion to 
consolidate appeals pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The State of Utah does not oppose 
consolidation. Each of the above-captioned criminal appeals 
originating in the Eighth District Court, Vernal Department, 
raises identical issues. The parties stipulated in the district 
court that the jurisdictional ruling in State v. Reber, Eighth 
District Court No. 021800320, would be binding in each case, and 
the court resolved jurisdiction as to each case in its Modified 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on January 29, 
2004. On the basis of the foregoing, the court agrees that 
consolidation of State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA, State v. 
Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA, State v.w . 
Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No. 20040644-CA is 
appropriate. Our consolidation order includes the duplicate 
appeals for Atkins and Thunehorst, which were opened following 
the entry of signed judgment and order on July 30, 2 004, and the 
filing of a second notice of appeal in each case on August 2, 
2004. 
The motion to consolidate appeals also seeks consolidation 
with State v. C.R., Case No. 20040281-CA, a juvenile appeal 
related factually to State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA. 
Although the juvenile appeal has issues in common with the above 
criminal appeals, resolution of the common issues will not 
necessarily be dispositive of the juvenile appeal due to the 
existence of additional issues raised only by the juvenile 
appeal. We decline to include this appeal in the formal 
consolidation, but will consider the relationship of the appeals 
in calendaring and disposition. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate appeals 
is granted, in part, and State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA, 
State v. Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA, 
and State v Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No. 
20040644-CA are consolidated for all purposes. All future 
filings shall be in Case No. 20040371-CA. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to consolidate appeals 
is denied, only insofar as it seeks consolidation of State v. 
C.R., Case No. 20040281-CA with the above-captioned appeals. 
Dated this day of August, 2 004. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Gum vn I^^Q 
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FILED 
,„ DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
JAN 2 9 2004 
JOANhEMcKEE, CLERK 
BY
- \U DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant. 
MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 021800320 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
The Court, having previously entered written findings on this matter, adopts those 
findings herein and makes further findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon the 
stipulations of the parties as follows: 
Defendant Rickie L. Reber is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife", a third degree felony, for allegedly assisting his 
son in taking a trophy buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "Book Cliffs" in southern Uintah County. Mr. Reber initially 
moved to dismiss the criminal charges claiming to be a member of the 
"Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area the alleged act occurred was in 
"Indian Country'. Mr. Reber, in the course of the litigation, abandoned his 
claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is 
a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either Shoshone or Ute decent. 
Defendant Steven Paul Thunehorst is charged with "aiding or assisting in the 
wanton destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly 
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern 
Uintah County. Mr. Thunehorst initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges 
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area 
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Thunehorst, in the course 
of the litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos 
Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of 
either Shoshone or Ute decent. 
3. Defendant Tex William Atkins is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton 
destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly 
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area 
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern 
Uintah County. Mr. Atkins initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges 
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area 
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Atkins, in the course of the 
litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", 
affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either 
Shoshone or Ute decent. 
4 With respect to Mr. Reber, it was stipulated by the parties that he claimed to be 
l/16th Indian by blood, from his mother. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. 
Atkins it was stipulated by the parties that they claim to be 1/16th Indian by 
blood, from their grandmother. Mr. Reber's mother, and the grandmother of Mr. 
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were listed on the termination proclamation. Their 
status as Indians was therefore terminated by the Ute Partition act of 1954, 25 
U.S.C. sec 677 et seq. (Hereinafter the "UPA). Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins 
may have a grandparent who had Indian blood but was not a member of a tribe 
which was recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs as an Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of 
Indian affairs by virtue of their status as Indian tribe. Mr. Thunehorst and Mr. 
Atkins have not produced evidence of the heritage of this person. 
5 Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins are not members of any Indian tribe 
recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs as an 
Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of Indian affairs by 
virtue of their status as Indian tribe. 
6 Mr. Reber is 51 years old, or was at the time of this Courts last ruling. 
7 Mr. Reber was born in Roosevelt Utah and lived in Lapoint Utah until he was 22. 
8 Mr. Reber has not lived on or near the Ute Indian Reservation since he was 22. 
9 Mr. Reber does not now claim to be a member of the Timpanogos tribe. 
10 Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins do not now maintain that the permit 
that they produced when they were contacted by law enforcement was valid, but 
do maintain that they believed that the permit was valid at that time of the alleged 
violations. 
11. Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins claim to be members of the "I Jintah 
Band", and that is the only group that they claim to be associated with. 
They all maintain that they are Indians of Utah Territory. They do not claim to be 
members of the Ute Indian Tribe, or of the Uintah band of the Ute Indian tribe 
which is one of the three constituent bands which comprise the Ute Indian Tribe, 
12. Mr. Reber was alive in 1961. Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins were born after 
1961, however Mr. Thunehorst's and Mr. Atkin's mothers, who were sisters, were 
alive at the time of the termination proclamation in 1961. 
The Court makes the following conch isic lis of la « v 
With respect to Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, even if the court were to not 
consider the issue of the UP A, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 et seq.9 they do not have significant blood 
quantum under the first prong of the two part analysis stated in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 
(4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846), which was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Perank, 
858 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1992) to be considered an Indian. The Court can find no benefit which 
is available base upon Indian blood quantum of 1/16th. Therefore for the purpose of qualifying 
for Federal programs or recognition they do not qualify based upon their quantum of blood. 
When describing a person as having 1/16 Indian Blood one must realize that necessarily means 
that same person is 15/16 non Indian. That means that he has 6 1/4% Indian blood and 
93 3/4 non Indian blood. This percentage of blood is simply not high enough to meet the first 
prong of the Rogers Test. The Court has found no Federal or State case which determined a 
percentage of Indian blood as low as 6.25 % to be significant under the Rogers Test. There is 
judicial precedence, Vialpando vs Wyoming. 640 P.2d 77, that 12 V2 % was not substantial 
under the Rogers Test. Other case have held that 12 lA % is substantial. This Court is unaware 
of any case which has gone below 12/4 %. The case that held 12'>4 % was substantial is Sully 
vs. United States 195 Fed. 2d. 113 which was issued by the 8th Circuit and is an old case. 
Even if Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkin's blood quantum was of a significant 
amount, the Court finds that the UP A terminated their status as an Indian for the purpose of 
criminal jurisdiction. Congress has the plenary power to legislate for Indian tribes in all matters. 
An individuals status as Indian for jurisdictional purposes is subject to the power of Congress to 
allocate jurisdiction between the State, Tribes, and the Federal Government. Congress clearly has 
the unilateral power to grant the State jurisdictions over persons who are Indian. . The statute in 
this case (Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 et seq.) says that upon termination, all statutes of 
the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be 
applicable to such member over which supervision was terminated and the laws of the several 
States shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply to other citizens within their 
jurisdiction. That provision clearly grants to the State jurisdiction over all persons who are listed 
in the termination proclamation which would include Mr. Reber's mother and Mr. Thunhorst and 
Mr. Atkins' grandmother. Therefore, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, Mr. Reber's 
Mother and Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother are no longer considered to be Indian. 
The natural consequence of termination of these ancestors as Indian is that each of the 
Defendant's would not be considered to have received any Indian blood from, in Mr. Reber's 
case, his mother and in Mr Atkins and Mr. Thunhorst case, their grandmother. 
The Court does not believe that Congress intended to terminate an ancestors status as 
Indian only to continue that relationship with their decedents. 
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction under Rogers Mr. Reber, does not have any 
Indian blood coming through his mother and since this is the only Indian blood which he claims, 
he does not have any Indian blood for the purposes of the Rogers analysis. As for Mr. Thunhorst 
and Mr. Atkins they also have no Indian blood coming from their maternal grandmother. The 
conclusion of this Court is based upon the conclusions of the Federal Court in the Felter case, 
U.S. v Orrana B. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 1002 (D.C. 1982), qff'd 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir 1985) and 
the Utah Appellate Court in the Gardner case State v. Gardner. 827 P. 2d 980 (Utah App. 
1992).. 
Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins argue that in spite of the termination of their 
ancestors Indian status, they have not been affected by the UPA; because in Mr. Rebers case he, 
and in Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' case their mother was alive at the time of the UPA. The 
absence of the Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' mother's name, or in Mr. Rebers case his name 
on the termination proclamation is not relevant to this inquiry. It only reflects that at the time of 
the termination act, Mr. Reber and the mothers of Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were not 
enrolled members of the Ute Tribe, and therefore could not be an individual who could receive 
tribal benefits. Because these individuals were not tribal members they could not have been 
listed on the termination proclamation. Nevertheless, their immediate ancestors were members 
of the tribe whose Indian Status was terminated. 
It is clear to the Court that by 1950 all relevant Indian hunting and fishing rights were 
vested in the Ute Indian tribe. No individual had a right to those hunting and fishing rights 
except through the tribe, and through membership in the tribe. Again it is evident to the Court 
that Congress did not intend to terminate Mr. Reber's mothers status as and Indian and Mr. 
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother's status as an Indian, only to recognize their children and 
grandchildren to have Indian hunting rights based upon Indian heritage which was 
Congressionally terminated. The argument that they were not among the 490 individuals listed in 
the UPA is therefore without merit. One is either a member or not. Whether or not they were 
eligible to be an individual who was entitled to membership is not the issue. Before this Court 
can take note of any privilege which is based upon tribal membership, that person must apply for 
and be granted membership by the tribe. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Reber, Mr. 
Thunhorst or Mr. Atkins have ever applied for or been granted membership by the Ute Indian 
Tribe. And there is no indication that Mr. Thunhorst, Mr. Reber or Mr. Atkins has been granted 
any other tribal membership. 
It would be inappropriate for the Court to extend any privilege which is available only 
through membership when the tribe has never granted those privileges through membership. 
Even if a Defendant may have once been eligible for membership that would not be relevant. 
You either are a tribal member or you're not. If you are eligible you need to apply and be granted 
those privileges. The Court was further convinced after reading Judge Jenkins opinion in Felter 
which was the basis for the Murdoch decision, U.Sv. Murdoch. 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir 1997), 
that there is a connection. The Court finds that all of those rights are vested in the Tribe. A 
members interest in that tribal property is personal and cannot be transferred or inherited. It is 
true that those 490 persons who were terminated under the UPA continue to have hunting and 
fishing rights it is not true that their heirs would continue to claim any interest in tribal property 
in their own right if they were not given the privileges of tribal membership. The rights of the 
terminated Utes to hunt and fish was not their personal property right and would be extinguished 
with their death and is not transferable or inheritable. The children of persons listed on the 
Termination Proclamation are not entitled through their parents to enjoy hunting and fishing 
privileges. There was a foot note I think from the Murdoch case, citing Judge Jenkins opinion in 
the Felter case, and I'm going to paraphrase that. In essence he said, those who are terminated 
Utes are readily identified and that their rights can be ascertained and that attrition would 
eventually extinguish the rights that they have because those rights are not inheritable or 
transferable and ultimately those rights would end 
The Court finds that Mr Reber does not have, independent of the Termination Act, 
sufficient blood quantum to qualify for an Indian under the Rogers Test. I believe for purposes 
considering the Termination Act considering the Rogers Test he has no Indian blood. Mr. Reber 
does not and can not have any hunting or fishing rights that come through his mother, because 
they have been terminated and they are not transferrable even though he was alive at the time of 
the Termination Act. Mr. Reber rights must be connected to the tribe who were the ones who 
had the hunting and fishing rights. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins the Court 
will not consider, for purpose of analysis, the Indian blood coming through their Maternal 
Grandmother. The same analysis will apply with respect to whether or not they receive any 
hunting or fishing rights from their Maternal Grandmother. Because the Court has found that no 
Defendant has sufficient blood quantum to satisfy the first prong of the Rodgers decision the 
Court need not inquire as to the second. 
All Motions with respect to claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction which are 
based upon claims that the defendants are Indians are denied. The Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the criminal cases which have been filed. 
yt Dated this x y _ ^ t ^ ^ 2 ( 
111 ( OURT 
A. Lynn Payne 
Eighth District Coin 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I delivered by US Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Michael L. 
Humiston Attorney for Defendant, 23 West Center Street P.O. Box 486 Heber City, Utah 84032, 
on this " ^ 7 , day of January, 2004. 
C^/> ,^ <sU A, A,t<_ti(_ .^/|^ 7 L—(jQ.-
A ddend i im C 
Edwin T. Peterson, 3849 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




JUDGMENT AND UKl>r 
PROBATION 
Case No. 023800320 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
OFFENSE: AIDING OR ASSISTING IN THE WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED 
\V!L[)LII'i: a lliiid Jcgiiv lt-l.ui,, 
THIS MATTER came on regularly before the above-named Court for sentencing this 
i» \ i'E, loilowing Defendant's adjudication of guilt in a jury trial to the above set forth offense, 
the Honorable A. Lynn i''^':^ presiding. The Defendant wos pnx..nal!v nrwnt :n-,.H ,, ,.. 
represented by his attorney of record, Michael Humiston. The State was represented by Edwin '.!'. 
TVi. ITS M 
The Court, having received statements by the State, Defense Counsel, the Defendant, and 
having reviewed letters submitted by Defendant, and no legal reason having been shown why 
judgment and sentencing should not be pronounced, entered a Judgment as follows: 
That the above-named Defendant, RICKDE L. REBER, is hereby adjudged to be guilty of 
the crime of AIDING OR ASSISTING IN THE WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROTECTED 
WILDLIFE, in violation of 23-20-4 and 23-20-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a 
third degree felony. Defendant is hereby sentenced to be confined in the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of no more than five (5) years. Execution of the prison sentence is suspended 
and the Defendant is placed on probation for a period of three (3) years on the following terms 
and conditions: 
1. That the Defendant abide by the terms of a probation stated herein. 
2. That the Defendant make himself available to report to this or any other Court 
whenever requested to do so. 
3. That the Defendant keep the Court and the Uintah County Attorney's Office 
informed of his current residential address and telephone number. 
4. That the Defendant violate no laws of the United States, State of Utah, or any 
municipality during the term of this probation. 
5. Defendant is to pay fine of one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250.00) or 
complete two hundred fifty (250) hours of community service, to be approved prior to it's 
accomplishment by the Uintah County Attorneys office, with proof of completion to the Court by 
2 
October 18, 2004. The Court shall hold the fine until all appellate eon<n\-W .<•.•:• 
completed. 
6 i V f e r u L t n i i is (<•' ( u \ I" n (In ml i k i l l a i ^ « $') ,(.)()( M ni l in K s t i n i l i i m in ilic 11 kil l 
Department of Wildlife Resources "stop poaching fund". The court finds that a downward 
depariun' in die recommended statutory restitution is in order due to the unusual factual basis of 
the'case and Defendant's lack of any prior criminal record. Restit i l m i .li;ill lw» p u n l In O M M I H ' T 
18, 2004. The Court shall hold the restitution until all appellate considerations, if any, are 
i:i 11 n p i e I I 
Defendant is not to have any firearms in his possession. 
8. Defendant is n : t tc hunt except with state issued license. 
The Court retains jurisdiction for further action in this matter. 
.. aEDthis 
ML 
A. Lynn P^yne 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FO; 
Michael Humiston 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
3 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered a copy of 
the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION to Michael Humiston, Attorney for 
Defendant, 23 West Center Street, Heber City, UT 84032; Department of Corrections, 152 East 
100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; and the Uintah County Jail, Vernal, Utah. 
DATED this Jj^i day of JYT\0^ 200^. 7 
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Addendum D 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICKIE L. REBER, 
Defendant. 
RULING FILED DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 





Case AU.. MJCb^U 
This matter came Ik ti n i lU i 'vun I i m L 
parties stipulated that: 
jnc 3, 2UUJ lor hearing. At the hearing the 
1 The Defendant's mother carried 1/8 "Indian Blood", and was named on the 
Termination Proclamation in 1961.1 
2. The Defendant's father dors no! bavr amy "IIIHIL^ .•• • . . 
3. The Defendant is 15,16 non-Indian by blood and 1.16 Indian by blood. 
4. The Defendant /- •>• .t .-.i-mocr oi any Indian'Iribe recognized as a Tribe by 
the United States Government. 
r
. The Defendant is 51 years old. He was born in Roosevelt and lived in 
Lapoint, Utah until he was 22. He has not lived in Indian Country since he was 22. 
6. Thel>frn<h;u ,:• 
Tribe". 
mpanogos 
7. rIlie Defendant does not maintain that the permit which he produced when he 
1
 In 1954 Congress passed the Lite Termination Act, August 27, 1954, Ch 1009, 68 State 
868, which is now found at 25 U.S.C. 677. "The Termination Proclamation, contemplated by 
Section 23 of the "Act", 25 U.S.C. Section 677v., was issued and published by the Secretary 
effective at midnight August 27, 1961. 26 Fed. Reg. 8.042." Affiliated Utes v. United States 406 
U.S. 128 at p 139; see also United States v. Felter. 546 F. Supp. 1002 (Utah D.C. 1982), at page 
p. 1006. 
1 
was first contacted by law enforcement is valid. He does maintain that, at that time, he 
believed that the permit was valid. 
This Court is bound by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perank, 858 
P.2d 927 and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399. Each of these cases held that the exterior 
boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation has been diminished and that there is no outer 
boundary to the reservation. The United States Supreme Court noted: "The operative 
language of the 1902 Act provided for allocations of reservation land to Indians, and that all 
the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain". (At 
412)..."It follows that when lands so reserved were 'restored' to the public domain - - i.e., 
once again opened to sale or settlement- - their previous public use was extinguished" (at 412). 
The Court then noted that when lands were returned to public domain, this stripped the land of 
reservation status (at p412). Finally the Court indicated that "our cases considering operative 
language of restoration have uniformly equated it with a congressional purpose to terminate 
reservation status." (at p. 413). Finally the Court held: "In light of our precedents, we hold 
that the restoration of unallotted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a 
congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent with die continuation of 
reservation status." 
Federal law defines Indian Country to include land within: Indian Reservations, 
dependent Indian Communities, and Indian Allotments. 18 U.S.C. 1151 (a), (b),(c). Federal 
case law also reserves jurisdiction of crimes which occur wiihin "Indian Country" involving an 
Indian as a victim to the tribes or the Federal Government. 18 U.S.C. 1152; Duro v. Reina, 
495 U.S. 676. However, State Courts have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes which occur 
within Indian Country where the defendant and victim are not Indian. Williams v. U.S., 327 
U.S. 711; State v. RoedL 155 P.2d 741 (Utah 1945). Federal Statutes do not define "Indian" 
for criminal jurisdictional purposes. In United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-
73 (1846), the United States Supreme Court suggested two factors to be evaluated in 
determining who is an Indian: (1) Whether the individual has a significant degree of Indian 
blood; and (2) Whether the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a tribe, or society 
of Indians, or by the Federal Government. The Rogers test for determining Indian status has 
been adopted by the Utah Appellate and Supreme Courts. State of Utah v. Hagen, 802 P2d 
745, 748 (Ut. App. Ct. 1990); State of Utah v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927; 932 (Ut. S. CT., 
1992). Until the Utah Supreme Court announces a new standard, this Court is bound by the 
Hagen 
2 
and Perank cases. Therefore, this Court will follow the Rogers test in determining whether 
the Defendant is an Indian. Any argument that Utah should follow the test announced in 
Lapier vs. McCormick. 986 F.2d 303 should be addressed to the Supreme Court.2 
Federal statutes do not address the issue of who has the burden to prove that a 
defendant (or victim) is an Indian or that the crime occurred in "Indian Country". The Utah 
Appellate Court in Hagen stated: "The State properly concedes that the prosecution was 
required to prove jurisdiction, i e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a 
preponderance of evidence." The Hagen Court cited State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 469-
470, as authority for the proposition that the State had the burden of showing that a defendant 
was not an Indian. However, the issue in Sorenson concerned territorial rather than personal 
jurisdiction. While territorial jurisdiction must be proved by the State by a preponderance of 
evidence in every criminal case (State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032) personal jurisdiction is not an 
element of an offense and need not be proved as such. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has 
not been consistent in requiring the State prove an individual is not an Indian. In an 
unpublished opinion (State v. Lucero, Case No. 860213 - Ca) a different panel of the 
Appellate Court held: "...Appellant had the burden to persuade the trial Court that he was an 
'Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. Section 1152-53." More importantly, our 
Supreme Court has indicated: "On these facts, we conclude that Perank carried his burden of 
factually establishing that he has been 'recognized racially' as a Ute Indian." Perank at 933. 
Given the fact that the Perank decision is the most recent appellate decision and that it is the 
opinion of our Supreme Court, this Court is bound to follow that decision. Therefore, 
altliough the State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries 
of the State of Utah and Uintah County, the defendant has the burden to show, by a 
2Some have argued that Indian status, for the purposes of determining Federal jurisdiction 
under Section 1152 and 1153 should be based entirely upon membership in a Federally 
recognized Indian Tribe. This test would allow Indians to make their own determination ot 
"Indian" status Reliance upon tribal membership would also provide an understandable and 
workable standard. It would avoid consideration of such subjective and transitory issues as self-
concept as being Indian and recognition as being Indian within Indian Society. It further avoids 
the quagmire encountered in making a determination of "Indian" status based upon Federal 
recognition Federal Statutes and Regulations which define "Indian" are inconsistent and 
confusing. Individuals are defined as "Indian" for some purposes and programs, but are not 
defined as "Indian" for other purposes and programs Where an individual comes within some, 
but not all, federal definitions, where does the Court draw the line in determining "Indian" status 
Is it sufficient if an individual meets at least one federal definition, or must he be recognized 
within "most" definitions; or perhaps he must meet all federal definitions of "Indian". A 
definition of "Indian" for the purpose of applying section 1152 which relies upon membership m 
a Federally recognized Indian tribe provide a much more workable standard than the test set forth 
in Hagen Nevertheless, most courts who have considered this issue have adopted the Hagen 
test. 
3 
preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under the Rogers test. 
Placing the burden on the defendant is consistent with what two Courts have 
characterized as the majority position of courts which have addressed the issue. Arizona v. 
Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1995 Ariz. App. Ct.); Vermont v. St. Francis. 563 A.2d 249. 
This is consistent with case law in: Arizona (VerdugoV. Vermont (St. FrancisV. New Mexico 
(State of New Mexico v. Cutnose. 532 P.2d 896, (N.M. App. 1974)); Nevada (State of 
Nevada v. Jack. 96 P.497 (1908)); Pendleton v. Sate of Nevada 734 P.2d 693 (1987); 
Oklahoma (State of Oklahoma v. Klindt. 782 P.2d 401, (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Washington 
(State of Washington v. Daniels, 16 P. 3d 650) and with sound public policy, "...the general 
rule is that the State has subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its territorial 
border. ...As an exception to that general rule, however, the Indian Country Crimes Act 
preempts State Court jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution when an offense involving an 
Indian occurs on Indian land...The federal statute is silent, however, on the issue of who bears 
the burden of proof to establish these jurisdictional facts." Verdugo at 1167. The Arizona 
Appellate Court then noted that while the State bears the burden to show the offense occurred 
within State boundaries, the elements of a criminal offense do not require the State to prove 
that the crime did not involve an Indian. The Court notes that to require the State to prove 
that the defendant and the victim were not Indian would place "...the state...in a position of 
having to prove the nonoccurence of events which might deprive it of jurisdiction." (Verdugo 
at 1168). The court went on to note: "If we were to place this burden on the state, the state 
would be compelled to allege...every conceivable exception to State Court jurisdiction." 
(Verdugo at 1168). Not only would the state be required to allege every exception to 
jurisdiction, the state would have the affirmative burden to prove that the exception did not 
apply. 
Wigmore suggest that in determining \yho should bear the burden of proof it is 
appropriate to consider that it is difficult to prove the nonexistence of a fact and it is 
appropriate to place the burden on die party who presumably has particular means of 
knowledge.) Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §2486 (1981). It is therefore 
relevant that there are over three hundred Indian Tribes which have been recognized by the 
Federal Government. Membership in any one of these tribes would be sufficient to meet the 
second test as set forth in Rogers (i.e. that the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a 
tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal Government). In addition to Federally 
recognized tribes there are many more Indian groups or societies of Indians which may form 
the basis to establish the second test in Rogers. It would therefore be virtually impossible for 
the state to prove that a particular individual was not a member of any of the possible tribes 
and Indian societies throughout the United States. Additionally, in many cases it would be 
impossible to prove that a particular person did not have a significant degree of Indian blood 
(which is the first test under Rogers). While it may be possible to determine the identity of a 
defendant's parents it may be impossible to prove that the parents do not have Indian blood. 
In the case of adopted persons, it would often be impossible to determine that the biological 
parents were not Indian. This becomes even more difficult as you consider whether 
4 
grandparents and great grandparents (who may be deceased) have Indian blood. All of this is 
complicated by the liberal interpretation courts have given to the term significant degree of 
Indian blood. Generally twenty-five percent is considered substantial. It is obvious that, the 
information which is relevant to a defendant's blood lines as well as his or her associations 
with Indian Tribes and societies, is uniquely within the knowledge of the Defendant and is 
usually readily available to the Defendant, while such information is often unavailable to the 
State. 
One must also remember that under 1151 the state is deprived of jurisdiction when a 
victim is an Indian. If the state bears the burden of proof, the state must show that each victim 
in every case is not an Indian. In most cases this could be easily accomplished by asking the 
victim a few simple questions during trial. However, not all victims are available to be 
examined at trial. Victims move and sometimes can not be located. Victims may die prior to 
trial. By definition, a victim in a homicide would never be available to testify concerning their 
blood lines or association with Indian Tribes and societies. Because Indian status may depend 
on association with Indian tribes, culture, and society, it would often be difficult to prove that 
a victim who is not present at trial was not an Indian. Occasionally, it is not possible for the 
State to even identify the victim by name. (One of the cases cited above (Jack) involved a 
victim of a homicide who was "commonly known by the name 'Lotta', whose real name was 
to the grand jury unknown." (P 497). If the State were required to prove that it has 
jurisdiction by disproving Indian status of each victim, there would be certain cases where the 
victim's status as an non-Indian could never be proved. By placing the burden on the State, 
this Court would be depriving the State of jurisdiction merely because the State has no access 
to the kind of information necessary to prove Indian status under Rogers. 
Considering all of the circumstances and public policy the burden is properly placed 
upon the defendant to show an exception to state jurisdiction by establishing a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant or victim has a significant degree of Indian blood and has 
been recognized as an Indian by an Indian Tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal 
Government. 
DATED this _ / _ - ' >f Jmre, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
PAYNE,DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 1 -? day of ^iw^iryy^H^ 2003, true and correct 
copies of the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T. 
Peterson, Deputy Uintali County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr. 
Michael L. Humiston, Attorney for Defendant, at 23 W. Center Street, P.O. Box 486, Heber 
City, UT 84032. 
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Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this t i t le, 
the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter, means 
(a ) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
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Addendum F 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Manuel Lucero, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 860213-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Garff and Greenwood. 
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PER CURIAM: r irrr'vhv»/ *K-'ol Cterk of the- Court 
Utah Court oi Appeals 
Defendant Manual Lucero appeals his conviction of making 
false material statements, a second degree felony under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-502 (1978). He alleges that because he is an Indian 
and associates with the Ute Indian Tribe, and because the crime 
was committed in "Indian country," the state court is deprived of 
jurisdiction over him. 
Appellant had the burden to persuade the trial court that he 
was an "Indian" within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 
-53. According to the record, this he failed to do. Such facts 
which may be relevant, but evidence of which is absent here, 
include: preponderance of Indian blood, recognition by the 
federal government or by an organized tribe; and recognized 
racial status. Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 1982); 
Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okl. Cr. 1982); cf. U.S. v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert, den. 444 U.S. 
859 (1979); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 2-3 (1942). 
Additionally, in his brief on appeal, appellant does not 
support his factual claims with any citation to the record on 
appeal, as required by R. Utah Ct.App. 24(a). References to the 
record are entirely absent from appellant's statement of facts as 
well as the argument section of his brief. In the absence of 
proper citations to the record supporting appellant's contentions 
on appeal, we presume regularity of the proceedings below and 
affirm the trial court. State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 
1982); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 
287 (Utah 1986); cf. Trees v. Lewis, 56 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 8 (1986). 
Appellant has the responsibility to marshal for this Court 
those pertinent references to the record that support his 
contentions on appeal. We will not undertake a complete review 
of the multiple volume record to search out error when appellant 
fails to do so. 
We view the evidence in the record as supporting the trial 
court1s determination that defendant is not an Indian for 
purposes of §§ 1152-53. 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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Addendum G 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TIMPANOGOS TRIBE, Snake Band of 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, 
Plaintiff, , 
VS. j 
KEVIN CONWAY, Assistant Director, Utah 




UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH 




This matter is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by 
Defendant Kevin Conway, Assistant Director of the State of Utah's Division of Wildlife 
Resources, and Defendant-Intervenor Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
(collectively "Defendants"). 
This case deals with the priority of hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the Ute 
Indian Tribe's Uintah and Ouray Reservation ("Reservation") in the State of Utah. Plaintiff, the 
self-proclaimed Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory, 
maintains in its Complaint that it has the right to issue hunting, fishing, and gathering permits to 
its members for use on the Reservation without interference from the Ute Indian Tribe or the 
State of Utah. It asserts this right based on its claim that its members are descendants of the 
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah, which existed on the Reservation land before 
either the Ute Tribe or the Reservation were established. Plaintiff further alleges that the 
Timpanogos band of Indians in Utah was Shoshone, not Ute, and that it maintained independence 
as a Shoshone tribe before and after the Ute Tribe and the Reservation were established. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that its members have superior aboriginal rights in the land's 
natural resources. 
Defendants do not recognize the Plaintiffs status as a tribe. Rather, they contend that the 
aboriginal Timpanogos band of Indians was Ute, not Shoshone, and that it merged into the 
Uintah Ute band of Indians (precursor to the Ute Tribe) in 1865. As a result of the merger, 
Defendants claim that the aboriginal Timpanogos band ceased to maintain an identity 
independent of the Ute Tribe and that the Ute Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for 
hunting, fishing, and gathering on the Reservation. Defendants also claim that the State of Utah 
has the right to prosecute individuals who are caught hunting, fishing, or gathering on the 
Reservation without a permit issued by the Ute Tribe* 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeks dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint with 
prejudice and judgment in Defendants' favor on their Joint Counterclaim (which is essentially a 
mirror image of Plaintiff s claims). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary 
Judgment is GRANTED. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe, Snake Band of Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory 
("Timpanogos Tribe") is not a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Nevertheless, Timpanogos 
Tribe claims aboriginal rights on land in Utah for its members, specifically the right to issue 
hunting, fishing, and gathering permits to its members in the area known as the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation or Uintah Valley Reservation ('^ Reservation") without interference from the State of 
Utah or the Ute Indian Tribe ("Ute Tribe")- As the basis for its claims, the Timpanogos Tribe 
alleges that its members are Shoshone, not Ute, and that it has the right to issue permits because, 
it alleges, its members are the "Indians ... for whom the [Reservation] was set apart." (Am. 
Verified Compl. <[fl[ 12-13.) It further alleges that its members, allegedly ancestors of the 
aboriginal Shoshone in Utah, have the right to hunt, fish, and gather on the Reservation free from 
prosecution by the State for hunting, fishing, or gathering without a permit issued by the State or 
the Ute Tribe. 
The Ute Tribe asserts that it, not Timpanogos Tribe, has the exclusive right to issue 
permits for hunting, fishing and gathering on the Reservation and that permits issued by the 
Timpanogos Tribe are not valid. The State of Utah asserts that the Timpanogos Tribe does not 
have the authority to issue such permits. Further, it does not recognize the Timpanogos Tribe-
issued permits as valid and intends to prosecute (or already has prosecuted) anyone (including 
members of the Timpanogos Tribe) for hunting, fishing, or gathering within the Reservation 
without a valid permit. 
The Defendants claim that the Timpanogos Tribe is trying to re-write history. The State 
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and the Ute Tribe assert that the Timpanogos Tribe1 was actually one of five bands of Utes that 
merged to form the Uintah Utes, who later, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands 
of Utes, joined together to form what is known today as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation. The Ute Tribe claims exclusive jurisdiction over the Reservation, which 
jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribal Business Committee, the Ute Tribe's elected governing 
body, through the Ute Tribe Constitution. 
In support of their argument, the Defendants point to a series of "Findings of Fact" in two 
1957 Indian Claims Commission ('ICC") decisions in the matter of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah 
v. United States, that, Defendants allege, conclusively establish that the Timpanogos merged 
with the Uintah Utes and thereafter ceased to exist independently of the Ute Tribe. See Uintah 
Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, Docket No. 44 (ICC Feb. 21, 1957), attached as Ex. 2 to 
Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Docket No. 44"); Uintah Ute 
Indians of Utah v. United States. Docket No. 45 (ICC Feb. 21, 1957), attached as Ex. 3 to Defs.' 
Br. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Docket No. 45"). 
Obviously, the factual findings of ICC are at odds with the claims the Timpanogos Tribe 
makes in this case. Pointing to the ICC decisions, the Defendants assert that the Timpanogos 
Tribe's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. But 
Timpanogos Tribe contends, among other things, that the Ute Tribe may not rely on the ICC 
decisions as precedent because of a 1960 stipulation between the Ute Tribe and the United States 
stating that the "final judgment [in the two 1957 ICC decisions]... shall not be construed as an 
defendants do not concede that the Timpanogos are a tribe. (See Defs.' Mot. at 2 n.l.) 
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admission of either party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case." See PL's 
Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 15-16 (quoting Apr. 22,1960 Stipulation for Entry of 
Final Judgment in the case of Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, attached as Ex. A to 
PL's Mem.). 
In addition to their issue preclusion defense, the Defendants submitted two expert reports 
purporting to set forth the history of the Ute Tribe and the relationship of the Timpanogos to the 
Utes. (See Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neil, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex. 4 to Defs.' 
Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and 
Archaeologist), attached as Ex. 5 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp.) Both experts conclude that the 
Timpanogos merged with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe 
known as the Timpanogos Tribe, that the Timpanogos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the 
Timpanogos, other than as members of the Ute Tribe, have no independent rights on the 
Reservation. (See id. at 2.) Both of Defendants' experts opine that historical, anthropological, 
and archaeological documentation shows that Plaintiffs' allegations are simply wrong, (See 
O'Neil Expert Report at 2 ("The historical evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert 
Report at 2 ("There is no anthropological, archaeological or historical evidence that supports 
such claims.").) They also conclude that the ICC Findings of Fact in the 1957 decisions are fully 
supported by the historical record and are accurate. (O'Neil Expert Report at 3*r Janetski Expert 
Report at 2.) 
Timpanogos Tribe did not submit its own expert reports in rebuttal, but it did submit 
affidavit testimony and other documentation in an effort to rebut the conclusions of the 
Defendants* experts. Defendants maintain that because Timpanogos Tribe did not submit an 
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expert witness report in rebuttal, as a matter of law the Plaintiff cannot prevail over the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. According to the Defendants, the issues raised are 
beyond the experience of the ordinary layperson and therefore require expert testimony. That is, 
the Defendants contend that because two expert witnesses came to a conclusion favoring the 
position of the Defendants, and because Timpanogos Tribe did not present contrary evidence in 
the form of an expert report, Defendants are per se entitled to summary judgment. 
The court analyzes each set of arguments in turn below. 
ANALYSIS 
Legal Standard 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 144 R3d 664,670 
(10th Cir. 1998). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs 
position will be insufficient [to overcome a motion for summary judgment]; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Liberty Lobby. 477 U.S. at 
252. See also Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co.» 181 F3d 1171,1175 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Amere 
scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's theory does not create a genuine issue of 
material fact."). 
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Defendants' Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion Defense 
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "'[w]hen an issue of 
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be 
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit"' United States v, Botefuhr. 309 F.3d 
1263, 1282 (10th Or. 2002) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson. 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)). The 
Defendants bear the burden of establishing the four elements of issue preclusion. Adams v. 
Kinder-Morgan. Inc.. 340 F.3d 1083,1093 (10th Cir. 2003). Those elements are: "'(1) the issue 
previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior 
action has been fully adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is 
invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against 
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
action." Botefuhr. 309 F.3d at 1282 (quoting Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190,1197 (10th 
Cir. 2000)). 
Thelessential issue in this case is whether the members of the Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe 
are actually ancestors of the Timpanogos, one of five historic Ute bands, and whether that band 
merged into the Uintah Ute Band of Indians, which then ultimately became the Ute Tribe for 
whom the Reservation was set aside. The 1957 ICC decisions addressed similar, if not identical, 
factual issues regarding aboriginal title to the Reservation and the make-up of the Uintah Ute 
Band through a determination of which smaller Indian bands merged into the larger Uintah Band. 
For example, the ICC found that the Shoshone and Utes were "separate and distinct." (Docket 
No. 44 at Finding of Fact No. 5.) The ICC also found that the Timpanogos merged into the 
Uintah Utes in 1865. (Id at Finding of Fact No. 4; Docket No. 45 at Finding of Fact No. 3.) The 
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ICC found that the Uintah Utes band, along with the Uncompahgre and White River Bands of 
Utes, occupied the Reservation and are now known as the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation. (Docket No. 44 at p. 32.) All of these issues are before this court. 
The parties in the ICC litigation were the United States and the Ute Tribe. The State was 
not involved in the litigation, but it appears to agree with and rely upon the findings of fact issued 
by the ICC in the 1957 decisions. The question becomes whether Plaintiff Timpanogos Tribe 
was a party to the 1957 litigation or was a party in privity with the Ute Tribe in 1957. 
Defendants contend that Timpanogos Tribe was a party to the litigation (through the Ute Tribe) 
because the Timpanogos merged into the Ute Tribe in 1865. But this begs the question facing 
the court now and presents a circular argument (i.e.. the Defendants' privity argument assumes 
the very fact it must prove - that the Plaintiff actually merged with and became part of the Ute 
Tribe in 1865, thereby ceasing to maintain an independent identity after that point). 
Given the unique circumstances of this case, the court finds that the Defendants have 
failed to establish the third element of issue preclusion. Accordingly, the Timpanogos Tribe is 
not collaterally estopped by the ICC decisions from raising the issues now before the court.2 
2The court does not agree with the Timpanogos Tribe's argument that the 1960 
Stipulation between the U.S. and the Ute Tribe (in which the parties finally settled the litigation 
and agreed that the final judgment of the ICC "shall not be construed as an admission of either 
party, for the purpose of precedent or argument, in any other case" (Ex. A. to PL's Opp'n Mem.)) 
prevents the Ute Tribe from relying on the ICC decisions as precedent. See, e.g.. U.S. Bancorp 
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship. 513 U.S. 18,26-27 (1994) ('"Judicial precedents are 
presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the 
property of private litigants and should stand unless a court finds that the public interest would be 
served by a vacatur.'") (internal citation omitted). In any event, Timpanogos Tribe's argument 
does not affect the State's right to cite to the ICC decisions, because the State was not a party to 
the Stipulation. Further, as noted above, the court is not allowing the Defendants to rely on the 
ICC findings of fact as evidence. 
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Nor will the court take judicial notice of the ICC Findings of Fact, as the Defendants 
suggest it should,3 because that would essentially undermine the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
and be contrary to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 201 provides that "[a] judicially noticed 
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). See 
also Tavlor v. Charter Med Corp,. 162 F.3d 827, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1998) ("court cannot take 
judicial notice of the factual findings of another court.. • because (1) such findings do not 
constitute facts 'not subject to reasonable dispute' within the meaning of Rule 201; and (2) 'were 
[it] permissible for a court to take judicial notice of a fact merely because it had been found to be 
true in some other action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be superfluous.'") (internal 
citations omitted); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp.. 128 F.3d 1074,1082 
n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) ("courts generally cannot take notice of findings of fact from other 
proceedings for the truth asserted therein because these findings are disputable and usually are 
disputed."); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 18 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing to Fed. 
R. Evid. 201(b), and noting that taking judicial notice of anything but a "universal truth" 
established by common knowledge, or "certain facts, which from their nature are not properly the 
subject of testimony," would be improper). Indeed, Defendants essentially admit the facts at 
issue in this case are not common knowledge, because they argue that the subject necessarily 
3See Defs/ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 12 (quoting language in Havasupai 
Tribe v United States. 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), affU 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991), 
which said that the "ICC proceedings . . . are an appropriate subject for judicial notice"). 
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requires expert testimony. Besides, it is clear that the factual issues before the ICC were subject 
to reasonable dispute and were determined after consideration of much documentary evidence. 
This creates a potential problem for the Defendants, because Defendants' Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts relies in part on the ICC Findings of Fact as evidentiary support for 
their position, (See, e.g., Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ, J. at 5-12.) But Defendants also 
rely on their expert reports, which do support Defendants' statement of facts. 
Expert Evidence 
Plaintiffs Failure to Present Expert Rebuttal Evidence 
To the extent that Defendants are contending that because the Plaintiff has failed to 
submit expert rebuttal evidence, as a matter of law Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, 
the court disagrees. The cases cited by Defendants - Randolph v. Collectramatic. Inc., 590 F.2d 
844, 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1979), and Keller v. Albright 1 R Supp. 2d 1279,1281-82 (D. Utah 
1997), affd. 141 F3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998) - do not support such an argument. 
Rather, the issue is whether the Plaintiff has presented admissible evidence that creates a 
genuine issue of material fact that must be tried by a jury. 
Defendants' Expert Evidence and Plaintiffs Rebuttal Evidence 
Defendants' Evidence 
Defendants* experts provide strong evidence to support Defendants' position.4 (See 
Expert Report of Floyd A. O'Neil, Ph.D. (Historian), attached as Ex. 4 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp. 
of Mot. for Summ. J.; Expert Report of Joel Janetski, Ph.D. (Anthropologist and Archaeologist), 
4The Plaintiff has not challenged the qualifications or methodology of the Defendants' 
expert witnesses. 
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attached as Ex. 5 to Defs.' Mem. in Supp.) Both experts conclude that the Timpanogos merged 
with the Utes many years ago, that presently there is no separate tribe known as the Timpanogos 
Tribe, that the Timpanogos are Utes, not Shoshone, and that the Timpanogos, other than as 
members of the Ute Tribe, have no rights on the Reservation. See id, at 2. Both of Defendants' 
experts opine that the historical, anthropological, and archaeological documentation shows that 
Plaintiffs* allegations are simply wrong. (See O'Neil Expert Report at 2 ("The historical 
evidence is all to the contrary."); Janetski Expert Report at 2 ("There is no anthropological, 
archaeological or historical evidence that supports such claims.").) They also conclude that the 
ICC Findings of Fact in the 1957 decisions are fully supported by the historical record and are 
accurate. (O'Neil Expert Report at 3; Janetski Expert Report at 2.) 
Plaintiffs Evidence 
In opposition, Plaintiff submitted the following evidence: Affidavit of Mary Meyer (Ex. E 
to PL's Mem. In Opp'n (hereinafter "Opp'n Mem.")), Affidavit of Dave Montes (Ex. J to Opp'n 
Mem.), an excerpt from the 1776 Dominguez-Escalante Journal (Ex. G to Opp'n Mem.)> the 
October 3,1861 Executive Order setting aside the Uintah Valley Reservation (Ex. H to Opp'n 
Mem.), an 1863 map purporting to show the boundaries of Shoshone territories (attached to the 
decision in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States. 95 Ct CI. 642 (1942), 
affd, 324 U.S. 335 (1945), and one or more 1863 United States treaties with the Shoshone) (Ex. 
L to Opp'n Mem.), a copy of the unratified June 8, 1865 Spanish Fork Treaty (Ex, I to Opp'n 
Mem.), the Utah State Tax Commission Apr. 27, 2000 Decision in the matter ofMaryMeverv. 
Customer Serv. Div, of the Utah State Tax Comm'n (Ex. C to Opp'n Mem.), the State's Pre-
Hearing Memorandum in the same Utah State Tax Commission matter (Ex. D to Opp'n Mem,), a 
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list of Timpanogos Tribe membership eligibility requirements (Ex. F to Opp'n Mem.), and a' 
Judgment issued by the Ute Tribal Court (Ex. K to Opp'n Mem.). 
The Mary Meyer and Dave Montes Affidavits 
In her affidavit, Mary Meyer states, among other things, that she is a member of the 
Timpanogos Tribe and presently is its Chief Executive Officer. (Meyer Aff. Yl 2-3.) She also 
makes the following assertion: "I descend from Shoshonean and Northern Paiute Ancestors. I 
am not Ute. I have no Ute Indian blood, nor have I ever been enrolled with the Ute Indian Tribe, 
a Federal Corporation." (Id. f 8.) Similarly, Dave Montes, in his affidavit, states that he is a 
Timpanogos Indian rather than a Ute, that he is a member of the Timpanogos Tribe, that he has 
never been a Ute Tribal member, that his children, mother, grandfather Leo Pritchett, and great 
grandfather Chief Tabby were never Ute Tribal members, that the Uintah Valley Reservation has 
always been his home, and that his great grandfather "spent most of his time in the Rock Creek 
area and always claimed the Wasatch Front as his home." (Montes Aff. ff 1,3-5, 7, 8-9.) 
Ms. Meyer's and Mr. Montes' personal statements offer nothing more than anecdotal 
information and are not relevant to the questions facing the court, particularly the question of 
whether the Timpanogos band of Indians merged with th$ Ute Indian Tribe, thereby ceasing to 
exist as an independent entity. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F,3d 
543, 548 (10th Cir. 2001): 
[The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians' ("UTSI")] argument assumes the very 
factual issue at the heart of this litigation. UTSI can only prevail on its contention 
if we accept its bare assertion that it is the present-day embodiment of the 
Shawnee Tribe. The only evidence even arguably offered by UTSI to support this 
proposition is the fact that UTSI is based on land patented to Mr. Oyler's ancestor 
by the Treaty. While this fact may establish that Mr. Oyler's ancestor was a 
member of the Shawnee tribe and that Mr. Oyler is therefore a descendant of a 
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tribal member, it says nothing about whether UTSI has maintained its identity 
with the Shawnee tribe and has continued to exercise that tribe's sovereign 
authority up to the present day. 
Id. at 548 (emphasis added). 
The Utah State Tax Commission Proceeding 
Plaintiff raises a collateral estoppel argument when it relies on documents in the April 27, 
2000 Utah State Tax Commission case of Marv Mever v. Customer Serv. Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n (Appeal No. 98-1181), to support its position. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,10,12, 
14,17-22; Ex. C to PL's Opp'n Mem (Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission); Ex. D to 
PL's Opp'n Mem. (State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Memorandum in tax proceeding).) According to 
Plaintiff, 
The Timpanogos Tribe was historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe 
and was of Shoshone [descent] Moreover, recently in the case of Meyer v. 
Utah State Tax Comm Vz,... the State of Utah and the Utah Tax Commission 
recognized Mary Meyer, the Chief Executive Officer of the Timpanogos Tribe, as 
"a member of the San Pitch [B]and of Timpanogos [T]ribe of Snake Indians[,]" 
"an Indian member of the Shoshone Nation[,]" and "not of Ute ancestry[.]" 
.. .This recognition is prima facie evidence of the Plaintiffs distinct identity 
[today]. 
(PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted).) In the Mever case, the issue was whether 
Ms. Meyer was exempt from the requirement to pay property taxes on her car because she was an 
Indian (non-Ute) living on the Reservation. 
Plaintiffs collateral estoppel argument is not persuasive here for a number of reasons. 
First, the Ute Tribe was not a party to the litigation, so at a minimum, only one of two 
Defendants would, in theory, be collaterally estopped. 
Second, the issue of Ms. Meyer's ancestry was not actually litigated. That is, the State of 
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Utah had no reason to dispute Ms. Meyer's assertion that she is not a Ute, because her assertion 
meant that the State would prevail on its claim for property tax from a non-tribal member. As 
Defendants note, "Ms. Meyer could have said she was of any ethnicity, heritage, or group other 
than Ute and the State would have had no reason to contest her claim." (Defs.' Reply Mem. at 
9.) Accordingly, the court disagrees with Plaintiffs overly broad statement that determination of 
"Ms. Meyer's ancestry [as a Shoshone] was necessary to the Utah State Tax Commission's 
judgment." (gee PL's Opp'n Mem. at 20.) 
Third, the issue actually litigated in the tax commission case was "whether the state may 
tax personal property of an Indian who lives on a reservation, but is not an enrolled member of 
the governing tribe." (Utah State Tax Comm'n Final Decision at 6 (Ex. C to PL's Opp'n 
Mem.).) The Mever decision assumes the truth of the proposition being challenged by the 
Plaintiff in this matter, namely that the Ute Tribe is the exclusive governing tribe of the 
Reservation. (See 14 at 5-7; see also State of Utah's Pre-Hearing Mem. in Meyer at 2 ("The Ute 
Tribe is the governing Tribe over the lands of the Ute Indian Reservation."") (attached as Ex. D to 
PL's Opp'n Mem.)) The Utah State Tax Commission administrative court did not decide the 
same issue facing the court today. 
Finally, as noted by the Defendants, "the Commission would not have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the Timpanogos' existence." See, e.g.. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conwav. 286 F.3d 1195, 
1203 (10th Cir. 2002) f i t is rudimentary that 'Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be 
extinguished only with federal consent' and that the termination of the protection that federal 
law, treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is 'exclusively the province of federal 
law.'") (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1979)). 
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The 1776 Dotninguez-Escalante Journal, the 1861 Executive Order, 
1863 Map of Shoshone Territory, and the Unratified 1865 Spanish 
Fork Treaty 
Plaintiff cites to these historical documents (Exs. G, H,1, and L to PL's Opp'n Mem.) to 
support its position that the Timpanogos Indians historically were recognized as a separate and 
distinct tribe of Shoshone descent that was induced to inhabit (and did inhabit) the area which 
became known as the Reservation. (See PL's Opp'n Mem. at 7-10,12-14,26.) The Plaintiff 
claims that these documents establish its members' aboriginal rights and that such aboriginal 
rights are superior to the Ute Tribe's rights and jurisdiction. 
The excerpt from the Dominguez-Escalante Journal notes the characteristics and location 
of the Timpanogos band of Indians in what was then Utah Territory. {Journal Excerpt (Ex, G to 
PL's Opp'n Mem.),) Plaintiff cites to this for the proposition that the "Timpanogos Tribe was 
historically recognized as a separate and distinct tribe and was of Shoshone [descent]." (PL's 
Opp'n Mem. at 7-8,12-13.) But the excerpt from the Journal makes no mention of Shoshone 
Indians. Moreover, it is not disputed that a separate Timpanogos band existed in 1776. (See 
Defs.' Reply Mem. at 5-6.) This piece of evidence does nothing to contradict the Defendants' 
evidence that the Timpanogos band merged into the Uintah Ute band of Indians in 1865 and 
ceased to maintain an identity independent of the Ute Tribe. 
The 1861 Executive Order (later approved by an 1864 Act of Congress) set aside a 
reservation in the Uintah Valley "for the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation of such 
of the different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory as may be induced to inhabit the same." 
(Oct. 3,1861 Exec. Order (Ex. H to Pi's Opp'n Mem.); Act of May 5,1864, ch. 77, 13 Stat. 63, 
§ 2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the unremarkable proposition that the Uintah Valley 
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Reservation was set aside as an Indian reservation by President Lincoln. (PL's Opp'n Mem. at 
13.) Plaintiff then makes the inference, in conjunction with citations to the 1776 Journal and an 
unratified 1865 treaty (discussed below), that "it is undisputed and historically documented that 
the Timpanogos Tribe constituted one of the 'different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory' 
for whom the Uintah Reservation was established/* (Id at 26.) At most, giving the Plaintiff 
benefit of the doubt, this tends to show that the Reservation was established for more than one 
tribe, all of which would co-exist and have equal rights on the Reservation. Even if Plaintiff is 
arguing that it be allowed to "co-exist" with the Ute Tribe on the Reservation, it ignores later 
historical events which suggest that the Utes were the only Indians for whom the reservation was 
set aside. For example, under the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18,1934,48 Stat. 984, the 
current Ute Tribe was formed by combining the Uintah, White River, and Uncompahgre bands of 
Ute Indians in 1936, Also, in 1937, the Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation were established with approval of the United States. See also 
Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States. 28 Fed. CL 768, 784-85 (Fed. CL 1993) (stating that 
"aboriginal title provides a given tribe with rights as against all except the sovereign" and "a tribe 
must prove exclusive possession of a parcel.. . . [M]ixed use of a given parcel 'precludes the 
establishment of any aboriginal title'"). 
The 1863 map cited by Plaintiff purports to show Shoshone territory in Utah. Plaintiff 
relies on it to show that Shoshone Territory included the land where the Reservation was 
established. But, in the court opinion to which it was attached as an exhibit, the court notes that 
the drawn boundaries were approximate. See Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United 
States, 95 Ct. CL 642 (Ct CL 1942). And the purpose of the 1863 treaties between the Shoshone 
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and the United States, for which the map was originally drawn, was to create peaceful relations 
between the tribe and the government, not to negotiate or establish any right or title to the 
territory indicated on the map. 
[T]he information [gathered by the agents of the government] as to the locations 
of various bands of these Indians and the area in which they lived and over which 
they roamed and hunted... was general in character and indefinite as to 
boundaries of specific areas and, also, as to specific bands or individual Indians of 
specific tribes The treaties [with the Shoshone] were intended to be, and we 
think they are, treaties of peace and amity because the Government had very little 
reliable information as to the territory actually occupied by these [Shoshone] 
Indians. 
Id. A map of approximate boundaries, by itself or in conjunction with the rest of Plaintiff s 
evidence, is simply not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact in this case. 
The Plaintiff also cites to the unratified 1865 Spanish Fork Treaty "with the Utah, 
Yampah Ute, Pah-Vant, Sanpete Ute, Tim-P-Nogs and Cum-Nn>Bah Bands of the Utah 
Indians." (Treaty (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem.) at 1 (emphasis added).) The Treaty provides in 
relevant part that the Timpanogos were a band of Indians in Utah Territory who were induced to 
"remove to and settle upon" the reservation described as "the entire valley of the Uintah River 
within Utah Territory extending on both sides of said river to the crest of the first range of 
contiguous mountains on each side." (Id at 1-2.) Plaintiff cites to this in support of the 
proposition that the Timpanogos Band was distinct and did not merge with the Utes, because, it 
appears, the Timpanogos Band was represented by a separate signatory to the treaty. Aside from 
the fact that the treaty was never ratified (the Senate rejected it in 1869 so it is not a binding 
document), it also contains language that contemplates giving the group of bands as one entity 
exclusive use and occupation rights of a single piece of land. Specifically, the Treaty provides 
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that one undivided tract of land is "reserved for the exclusive use and occupation of the said 
tribes," (Treaty art. II (Ex. I to PL's Opp'n Mem,) (emphasis added).) This language is 
inconsistent with the Timpanogos Tribe's contention that the Reservation was set aside for it, not 
for the Ute Tribe. (See> e.g.. Am. CompL 112.) 
Timpanogos Tribe Eligibility Requirements and the 1979 Ute Tribal 
Council Decision 
The fact that a modern day entity calling itself Timpanogos Tribe maintains the eligibility 
requirements set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit F does not create a genuine issue of material fact. 
The court must look to historical evidence to make its determination. 
In the 1979 Ute Tribal Council decision (attached as Exhibit K to PL's Opp'n Mem.), the 
Ute Tribal Council decided that certain individuals, some of whom were apparently ancestors of 
affiant Dave Montes, did not meet the requirements for Ute Tribe membership. The tribal 
court's holding does not tell us anything other than the fact that certain relatives of Mr. Montes 
were not members of the Ute Tribe. This does not support Plaintiff s claims. Plaintiff asks the 
court to make unreasonable inferences and leap to the conclusion that because Mr. Montes and 
his ancestors are not Ute, the Plaintiff, whose members include Mr. Montes, is a Shoshone tribe 
in existence since aboriginal times and for whom the Reservation was set aside. The court will 
not make that leap, nor will it allow a jury to do so. 
In short, Plaintiff has presented nothing more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence, which 
is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co,. 181 




For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
DATED this jfcS^day of January, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
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Addendum H 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEPUTY 
STATE OF UTAH, : RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : D^TR/CT COURT 
UINTAH C O U N ^ A H 
vs. : JAW 2 1 2004 
RICKIE L. REBER, : Case No.: 021800320 B Y J ^ ^ C T 8 , CLERK 
Defendant. : 
The Court has reviewed the Defendant's pleading entitled "Witness Re: Reliance Upon 
Written Court Opinion, U.C.A. §76-2-304, as well as the pleadings relating to the Plaintiffs 
objection to the proposed witnesses. The Defendant alleges that he was acting in reliance upon 
a written interpretation of the law as contained in the following Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
cases: Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation v. Utah. 114 F. 3d 1513; and 
Timpanogos tribe v. Conway, 286 F. 3d 1195. To support his defense of ignorance or 
mistake of law, Defendant proposes to call the Appellate Court Judges who wrote the opinion 
of the Court in the above cases (to explain the case); a professor of law (to explain principles 
of Indian law); the Uintah County Recorder (to verify the location of the offense); the Chief 
Executive Officers of the "Timpanogos Tribe" (to explain the rights which the "Timpanogos 
Tribe" seeks to exercise in Timpanogos v. Conway); a senior member of the Uintah Band (to 
explain the history and traditions of Indians of Utah Territory and the history of litigation 
involving Indians of Utah Territory); and an "Indian of Utah Territory" (to explain Indian 
culture and religion and the government of the Uintah Band); an enrolled member of the 
Uncompahgre Band and former member of the Ute Tribe Business Committee (to explain the 
historical separate existence of Uintah Band, to explain the rights retained by the Uintah Band 
and explain all relevant written laws and resolutions); and, a retired law professor (to explain 
the archeological, ethnological, and linguistic evidence connecting the Uintah Bank with 
Shoshone Indians). 
Our Rules of Evidence indicate that "All relevant evidence is admissible . . . " Rule 402 
U.R.E. "Relevant evidence" is defined as evidence "having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E. Our statutes also 
provides (1) " In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the Court...(2) The jury 
- - - are bound to follow the law as stated by the Court" 77-17-10(c) U.C.A. Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure also mandates that the court instruct the jury in writing at 
the conclusion of the evidence. 
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The above witnesses are offered as witnesses concerning the Defendant's defense of 
Ignorance or mistake of law under U.C.A. 76-2-34 (2)(b). That section states: 
"(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no 
defense to a crime unless: . . . 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actions reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) The official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant 
of permission by an administrative agency changed by law with responsibility for interpreting 
the law in question; or of the law contained in an opinion of a Court of record or made by a 
public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a Court 
of record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question." 
Defendant has now abandoned his original claim that die permit he showed the officers 
at the scene (which was issued by the "Timpanogos Tribe") was a valid license which allowed 
the permittee to hunt wildlife. He now claims that, although the permit was not valid, at the 
time, he reasonably believed that it was valid. Alternatively at various times, Defendant has 
indicated that he was entitled to hunt without a permit issued by the State either: 
(1) Because he is a descendant of a terminated Ute and has inherited hunting privileges 
from his mother; or 
(2) Because he was alive at the time that the Termination Proclamation was issued and 
was not listed on the proclamation; and therefore has maintained rights to hunt; or 
(3) Because he is an aboriginal Indian of Utah Territory who retains aboriginal hunting 
rights. 
In its prior order this Court has ruled that hunting and fishing rights can not be 
inherited; that the Defendant's Indian status was terminated when his mother was listed on the 
Termination Proclamation; and, because he is 93.75% non-Indian, he does not possess a 
significant quantum of Indian blood and is not entitled to Indian status under U.S. v. Rogers, 
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567. It is therefore apparent to the Court that in order for the Defendant to 
raise the defense of mistake of law based upon the 10th Circuit opinions, he must introduce 
evidence that: 
(1) He actually read the opinions or was informed of the decisions in a manner which 
could support reasonable reliance (if indeed one can ever reasonably rely upon hearsay 
concerning the contents of an opinion); and 
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(2) The holding in at least one of the cases was either: 
(A) The "Timpanogos Tribe has legal authority to issue permits to take wildlife; 
or 
(B) Descendants of terminated Utes, inherit their terminated parents rights to 
hunt wildlife; or 
(C) Children of terminated Utes who were alive at the date of the Termination 
Proclamation, who were not listed on the proclamation, maintain rights to hunt; or 
(D) A person who is only 6.25% Indian has a significant quantum of Indian 
blood under Rogers; and, 
(3) He relied upon the holding in acting or failing to act; and 
(4) His reliance on the holding was reasonable. 
The Court has carefully read each of the cases relied upon by the Defendant. 
Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway decided two narrow procedural issues: (1) Whether the Federal 
District Court had jurisdiction to consider the "Timpanogos Tribe's" claims; and (2) Whether 
the State of Utah was entitled to a dismissal under 12(b)(6) (Federal rules of Civil Procedure) 
for failure to state a claim of action based upon immunity of the State under the Eleventh 
Amendment. The Court held that the fact that the "Timpanogos Tribe" was not recognized as 
an Indian Tribe by the Federal Government did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction; 
and that, because the Plaintiffs only requested prospective injunctive relief, the State was not 
entitled to a 12(b)(6) dismissal based upon immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah is an attempt by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
to resolve conflicts between its prior holding in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773F.2d 1087 and 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hagen v. Utah. 510 U.S. 399. The case 
addresses the issues of the boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation in light of the 
foregoing decisions. No issue relative to this case was considered by the Court. 
For the purpose of considering the issue of the Defendant's Indian status, the State has 
indicated that it will concede that the offense occurred within Indian Country. Even assuming 
that the offense occurred within Indian Country, the Court has previously ruled that the 
Defendant does not have Indian status and that the Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, in order 
to advance its defense the Defendant must point to language in one of the cases which would 
reasonably lead the Defendant to believe one of the alternatives listed in (2) (A) through (D) 
above. 
Page 3 
Neither of the cases which the Defendant relies upon held that: "The Timpanogos 
Tribe" has legal authority to issue hunting permits; or, children of terminated Utes inherit 
hunting rights; or, children of terminated Utes who were alive at the date of the Termination 
Proclamation retain hunting rights; or, a person who is 6.25% Indian has a significant 
quantum of Indian blood under U.S. v. Rogers. Therefore, the Defendant can not advance a 
defense of ignorance or mistake of law based upon either case. It would be unreasonable as a 
matter of law for the Defendant to read either or both of these cases and conclude that the 
"Timpanogos Tribe" had legal authority to issue a permit, or that he was entitled to hunt based 
upon any of the various theories which are based upon his claimed Indian Status, or that he 
had a right to hunt based upon a permit issued by the "Timpanogos Tribe". 
In addition, it is apparent that the proposed testimony is not relevant to the defense of 
ignorance or mistake of law and that some of the testimony is improperly offered to instruct 
the jury as to the law. The defense of ignorance or mistake of law requires reasonable reliance 
upon a written decision of a Court of record. The reliance can be based only on the written 
opinion: "The language of Section 76-2-304 clearly and unambiguously requires a written 
interpretation, by either a Court of Record or a public servant, in order for mistake of law to 
be an available defense." (State v. Norton, 67 P.3d 1050 at 1053). The opinions which the 
Defendant relies upon were opinions of a panel of Judges. Each opinion is what it is; the 
opinion of the panel can not be added to or subtracted from through parol evidence from one 
of its members. The law expressly requires that the reliance must be based on the opinion 
itself not some subsequent explanation of the opinion from a panel member. Similarly, it 
would be inappropriate to allow a professor of law to testify as to general principles of law 
upon which Indians routinely rely. The defense is specifically tied to written opinions issued 
by a Court of record, not general principles of law. The Defendant seeks to present evidence 
regarding: the purpose of the Timpanogos Tribe in bringing the lawsuit and the rights they 
seek to enforce; Indian history and tradition; Indian culture and religion; the separate existence 
of the Uintah Band and the rights of its members; the laws and resolutions of the Uintah Band; 
and the archeological, ethnological, and linguistic connection to the Shoshone Tribe; However, 
none of this testimony is relevant to the written opinion upon which Defendant relies. Neither 
is the testimony of Mr. Simmons concerning the location of the alleged crime. 
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Based upon the above, the Court finds that the proposed testimony is not relevant 
because it does not have any tendency to make it more probable or less probable that the 
Defendant relied upon either 10th Circuit case. The Court will also find as a matter of law that 
the Defendant could not reasonably rely upon either Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway or Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Utah to advance his defense of ignorance or mistake of law. 
DATED this ^fl_day of January, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNg?t>ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the Q? 1 day of January, 2004, true and correct copies of the 
Ruling and Order were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T. Peterson, 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr. Michael L. 
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COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH "K)\{ j '^H 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICKIE L. REBER., 
Defendant. 
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RULING 
Case No. 021800320 FS 
This Court has received under certification from the trial court judge the Defendant's 
Motion to Disqualify. 
After fully reviewing the file, and within the provisions of Rule 29(c)(2) U.R.Cr.P., the 
Court finds that based upon the allegations supported by affidavit for the Motion to Disqualify 
that bias and prejudice, if any, that is alleged was loiown by the affiants prior to the court's ruling 
on the question of jurisdiction. Since Rule 29(c) requires the motion to disqualify to be filed at 
least within 20 days of (a) the assignment of the action or hearing to the judge, (b) the appearance 
of the party or the party's attorney, or (c) the date on which the moving party learns or with 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is 
based are all adequately and woefully late. The parties in this case have adequately and 
knowledgeably presented the arguments for determining jurisdiction when the Defendant has 
claimed to be an Indian. Those matters have been adequately briefed, well argued, and the trial 
court's ruling seems to be well supported in the case law. 
It would seem that the Defendant has waited to disqualify the judge until almost eleven 
months after this case was filed when he obtained an unfavorably ruling. Therefore, the matter 
will be returned to the trial judge. The Motion to Disqualify is hereby denied. 
DATED this 10th day of November, 2003. 
John R. Anderson 
Eighth District Court Judge 
